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NAVIGATING DANGEROUS CONSTITUTIONAL
STRAITS: A PROLEGOMENON ON THE
FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT AND THE
DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF SEXUAL
MINORITIES
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.* AND E. GARY SPITKO** ***
Activist judges, however, have begun redefining marriage by court
order, without regard for the will of the people and their elected
representatives. On an issue of such great consequence, the people's
voice must be heard. If judges insist on forcing their arbitrary will
upon the people, the only alternative left to the people would be the
constitutional process. Our nation must defend the sanctity of
marriage.1
"[P]reserving the traditional institution of marriage" is just a kinder
way of describing the State's moral disapproval of same-sex
couples.
2
In his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia warned that the
majority opinion's reasoning in that case 3 effectively established the
* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law.
** Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law.
*** The authors would like to thank June Carbone, Brad Joondeph, Marc Spindelman,
and Stephanie Wildman for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and Norman
Morales and Vivian Ware for their research assistance.
1. President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State
of the Union (Jan. 20, 2004).
2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the
original).
3. See id at 578-79 ("The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The
state cannot demean their existence or control their destiny .... Their right to liberty under the
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legal groundwork for the judicial imposition of same-sex marriage. 4
Some cultural conservatives, heeding Justice Scalia's warning, have
launched a preemptive attack in the "culture war" 5 against the potential
use of the federal Constitution to extend marriage rights to same-sex
couples. 6 A variety of individuals and organizations, notably President
George W. Bush and conservative groups such as Focus on the Family,
the Christian Coalition, the Traditional Values Coalition, and Concerned
Women for America, currently are urging the enactment of a
constitutional amendment that would ban same-sex marriage in the
United States. 7 Indeed, some proponents of an amendment would prefer
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of
the government .... The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.... As the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater
freedom.").
4. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinion dismantles the structure of
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned."). See also
Andersen v. King County, 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Super.) (stating that Lawrence has
"obvious significance" to the present challenge of a marriage law that excludes same-sex
couples). But see Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)
(rejecting "contention that Lawrence establishes entry in same-sex marriage as a fundamental
right").
5. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to
"Kulturkampf' in the context of the debate over gay and lesbian civil rights); Marc R. Poirier,
Hastening the Kulturkampf. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Politics of American
Masculinity, 12 TUL. J.L & SExuALTY 271, 299 (2003) ("In the wider American culture,
'culture wars' means something like unrestrained political and cultural combat motivated by
moral righteousness, with the understanding that something vital for the survival of society is
at stake.").
6. Along with the Court's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, the opinion of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003), legalizing same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, has raised alarm among those
who oppose same-sex marriage. See 150 CONG. REC. S1414 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Frist (R-Tenn.)) ("Beginning on May 17 of this year, Massachusetts will
begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Once these same-sex couples sue for
recognition in their home States, the wildfire will truly begin. Same-sex marriage is likely to
spread to all 50 States in the coming years. So regardless of what Massachusetts does today, it
is becoming increasingly clear that Congress must act and must act soon.").
7. See Alan Cooperman, Christian Groups Say They Won't Give Up: Amendment's
Religious Supporters See Long-Term Fight, Plan to Focus Energy on State-Level Votes,
WASH. POST, July 15, 2004, at A4 (discussing the Arlington Group, "a coalition of 53
religious organizations that have been working together to oppose same-sex marriage" and
listing several members of the group and which version of an amendment they favor);
Katharine Q. Seelye, Conservatives Mobilize Against Ruling on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2003, at A29 (reporting that an alliance of conservative advocacy groups would
"lobby for efforts already underway for an amendment to the Constitution"); see also Elisabeth
Bumiller, What Partisans Embrace, Politicians Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, § 4 (Week
in Review), at 1 (observing that "[i]n one comer are the social conservatives with their fists
raised against gay marriage, girded for a new battle in the cultural wars" while "[in the other
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a broadly worded amendment that would preclude any legal recognition
of same-sex relationships including civil unions or domestic
partnerships. 8 An issue for such proponents is the political calculation
that the more complete ban would seem less likely to gain broad support
in the Congress and in the states. A Focus on the Family spokesman has
explained that "it's purity versus pragmatism," with proponents of a
complete ban asking "[d]o we go for everything we want, or take the best
we think we can get?" 9
An additional issue for opponents of same-sex marriage is the
concern that the less sweeping and explicit the amendment the less likely
it will be successful in actually proscribing same-sex marriage while
preserving mixed sex marriage. In this Article, we argue that to ban
state-sanctioned same-sex marriage effectively while preserving state-
sanctioned marriage for mixed-sex couples, a constitutional amendment
at a minimum must expressly repeal the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' gender equality protections.10 The catch-22 for same-sex
marriage opponents is that such an amendment, we expect and we hope,
would be a political non-starter.
We begin by demonstrating that the leading Federal Marriage
Amendment proposal and similar proposals are ill-fitting with our
constitutional structure and inconsistent with our constitutional
traditions. First, these Federal Marriage Amendments are highly
intrusive of state sovereignty in an area of traditional state power and,
thus, would undermine important benefits of our federal system. They
would preempt state experimentation with respect to an important social
and civil rights issue just as an informed national debate on the issue has
begun. Second, the Federal Marriage Amendment proposals represent a
decided break with the important American constitutional tradition of
comer are gays, lesbians, and their supporters, fists aimed at those who would press a
constitutional amendment banning gay marriage").
8. Cooperman, supra note 7 ("Some members of the Arlington Group, such as the
Christian Coalition, favor an amendment that would ban same-sex marriage but not civil
unions. Others, such as the Traditional Values Coalition and Concerned Women for America,
want to ban both."); Doreen Brandt, Anti-Gay Amendment Seekers Divided Over Severity,
365Gay.com, Nov. 29, 2003, at www.365gay.com/newscontent/112903amendment.htm
(noting that "[t]wo camps appear to be emerging within the umbrella of organizations that
formed to oppose same-sex marriage" and explaining that one camp's approach would "bar
gays and lesbians from marrying but allow same-sex couples to receive some benefits"
whereas the "larger and more draconian camp" wishes to place "civil unions and all benefits-of
marriage... beyond the reach of gay couples"); see also Seelye, supra note 7 (noting that the
Traditional Values Coalition "had agreed that an amendment should ban same-sex marriage,
ban same-sex unions, and ban gays from receiving benefits of any such unions").
9. Brandt, supra note 8.
10. See infra text and accompanying notes 85-148.
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amending and interpreting the federal Constitution in order to draw ever
more inclusive lines of equality rather than to disadvantage an unpopular
minority.
Next we demonstrate that the United States Supreme Court is likely
to interpret narrowly the Federal Marriage Amendment. Because a
Federal Marriage Amendment would contravene the deeply embedded
constitutional ideals of equal protection and due process, it would invite
a narrow interpretation that might undercut its effectiveness at preserving
marriage rights for heterosexual relationships only. Moreover, the
Supreme Court's historical approach to integrating new amendments into
the existing constitutional text suggests that the Court will not imply
from the Federal Marriage Amendment the repeal of existing
constitutional protections beyond what is expressly called for by the
specific text of the amendment. Thus, ratification of any of the leading
Federal Marriage Amendment proposals would leave the Court able
plausibly to protect same-sex equality utilizing existing constitutional
text. We conclude that the most likely avenue for the Court to do so is
through the prohibition against invidious sex discrimination embodied in
the Equal Protection Clause. For this reason, proponents of
"constitutionalizing" discrimination against gay and lesbian couples may
guarantee their objective only by expressly repealing the Equal
Protection Clause's sex discrimination ban.
In early 2004, President Bush weighed in on the matter of a
constitutional amendment with respect to same-sex marriage. In his
January 2004 State of the Union address, President Bush decried
"activist judges" who "have begun redefining marriage by court order." 1
The President called upon the Nation to "defend the sanctity of
marriage."' 12 Shortly thereafter, in February 2004, he called for a federal
constitutional amendment to prevent any state from recognizing same-
sex marriage. 13
11. President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State
of the Union (Jan. 20, 2004).
12. Id.
13. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Calls for Constitutional
Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html (decrying "activist
judges and local officials [who] have made an aggressive attempt to redefine marriage" and
calling for a constitutional amendment limiting marriage to one man and one woman). See
also Greg Hitt & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Bush Backs Constitutional Ban on Gay Marriage,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2004, at A3. Cf Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the
Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224, 1224-25 (1966) (noting
that "Itihe Supreme Court's 1964 decision in McLaughlin v. Florida seems to portend the
demise in that Court of state laws forbidding interracial marriage" and decrying "the very real
possibility that the Court will impose upon the country its own views of what is desirable").
[Vol. 76
DANGEROUS CONSTITUTIONAL STRAITS
Some members of Congress also have heeded the call for action:
members in both the House and Senate introduced legislation proposing
a constitutional amendment that would prohibit same-sex marriage as a
matter of federal law. 14 This amendment, authored and introduced by
Representative Marilyn Musgrave (R-CO) in the House and by Senator
Wayne Allard (R-CO) in the Senate (the "Musgrave/Allard
Amendment"), would ban any federal or state judicial or legislative
recognition of same-sex marriage and would purport to preclude judicial
interpretation of the federal or state constitutions in a manner that would
require provision of equal treatment between married and same-sex
couples.
In relevant part, the Musgrave/Allard Amendment provided that
"Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man
and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any
State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents
thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a
woman." 15 Advocates of a broader amendment wished to add a third
sentence to the amendment providing that "[n]either the federal
government nor any state shall predicate benefits, privileges, rights or
immunities on the existence, recognition or presumption of non-marital
sexual relationships."
' 16
In July 2004, the Senate took up debate on a proposed constitutional
ban on same-sex marriage. After more than three days of debate,
proponents of the Musgrave/Allard Amendment failed to win the
For reasons that he has never explained, President George W. Bush, in the eleventh hour of his
re-election campaign, endorsed the concept of civil unions for same-sex couples. "I don't
think we should deny people rights to a civil union, a legal arrangement, if that's what a state
chooses to do so." On the Record, WASH. BLADE, Oct. 29, 2004, at 44, available at
www.washblade.com/advertising/eTearsheets/pdf/10-29-2004/044.pdf (reporting and quoting
President Bush's comments on ABC's Good Morning America program on October 26, 2004).
In this regard, "he disagreed with the Republican Party platform, which opposes civil unions."
Id.
14. See H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res.
30, 108th Cong. (2004).
15. S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong: § 2 (2004). On March 22, 2004, the key sponsors of the
version of the Federal Marriage Amendment then pending before Congress announced that
they had decided to replace the pending version with a reworded proposed amendment in order
to clarify that the amendment would not ban states from adopting legislation that would
establish civil unions. Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Being Retooled, WASH.
POST, Mar. 23, 2004, at A4; H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong.
(2003); see also S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (2004). President Bush has endorsed this amending
language. See Cooperman, supra note 15 (reporting comments of White House spokesperson
that President Bush "concurs with the new wording" of the revised Federal Marriage
Amendment proposed on March 22, 2004 by Sen. Wayne Allard (R-CO) and Rep. Marilyn
Musgrave (R-CO)).
16. Brandt, supra note 8.
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necessary sixty votes to limit debate and allow a direct vote on the
amendment. Indeed, the vote on cloture was 50-48 against forcing a
vote.1
7
In September 2004, the House of Representatives did vote on the
Musgrave/Allard Amendment. The vote was 227-186 in favor of the
amendment. 18 Thus, proponents fell well short in the House of the two-
thirds majority needed to approve the amendment.
Proponents of a Federal Marriage Amendment have vowed to
continue to press for it, just as proponents of same-sex marriage will
continue to press for both legislative and judicial recognition of marriage
rights for same-sex couples. 19 As Representative Tom Delay (R-TX),
the GOP's Majority Leader in the House of Representatives, has vowed:
"we will be back. And we will be back. And we will be back. We will
never give up. We will protect marriage in this country."'20  DeLay
suggests that the same-sex marriage issue "is going to be huge" in the
future and has promised to bring the proposed amendment up for another
vote in 2005.21
We suspect that the debate over such an amendment will flare up
each time a court rules that a state constitution requires that the state
sanction same-sex marriage. 22 And we suspect that support for such an
17. 150 CONG. REC. S8090 (daily ed. July 14, 2004). See also Carl Hulse, Senators
Block Initiative to Ban Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 15, 2004, at A1; Helen Dewar, Ban
on Gay Marriage Fails; Senate Vote on Amendment Is a Defeat for Bush, WASH. POST, July
15, 2004, at Al.
18. 150 CONG. REC. H7933 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004). See also Helen Dewar, House
Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Ban, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2004, at A27.
19. See Cooperman, supra note 7 ("Despite a defeat in the Senate yesterday, evangelical
Christian groups said they would continue to push for a constitutional amendment to ban
same-sex marriage, but some predicted that it would be a 10-year battle."); Dewar, supra note
17 (reporting comments of Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) ("This issue is not
going away") and Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) ("We will be back again and again")); Hulse,
supra note 17 (reporting that after the July 2004 Senate vote "proponents [of a constitutional
amendment have] pledged to continue to push the idea, arguing that they have the support of
mainstream Americans" and reporting the comments of President Bush: "Activist judges and
local officials in some parts of the country are not letting up in their efforts to redefine
marriage for the rest of America and neither should defenders of traditional marriage flag in
their efforts."); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Same-Sex Marriage Amendment Fails in House, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at A12 (reporting that "[t]he measure's supporters vowed to keep up their
drive against same-sex marriage" and reporting the comments of supporters suggesting the
same).
20. 150 CONG. REC. H7924 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Sen. DeLay). See
also Carolyn Lochhead, Gay Republican Castigates Party Over Marriage Vote, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 1, 2004, at A3.
21. We Don't, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 11, 2004, at 14.
22. See Dewar, supra note 17 (quoting the president of the "Alliance for Marriage" as
stating "Our amendment will continue to gain ground so long as activists continue to strike
down our marriage laws in court.").
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amendment will greatly increase when and if a federal court rules that the
federal Constitution requires that a state must sanction a same-sex
marriage contracted within its borders or must grant recognition to a
same-sex marriage contracted within a sister state.
23
Of great concern to some with respect to the Musgrave/Allard
Amendment and similar amendment proposals that are being bandied
about is the incursion on state sovereignty in an area of traditional state
power that these Federal Marriage Amendment proposals would
represent.24 The Musgrave/Allard Amendment is remarkably intrusive
23. See Tom Curry, Gay Marriage Vote Appears Doomed: Senate Leaders Unable to
Agree on Procedure, MSNBC, July 13, 2004, at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5416297 (quoting
Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) as stating "I support the federal Defense of Marriage Act,
which protects the traditional right of states to determine for themselves what constitutes
marriage.... As long as this law is on the books, I see no need for a Constitutional
Amendment.").
On July 22, 2004, the House of Representatives approved (233 to 194) a bill (the
Marriage Protection Act) that would strip federal courts of jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of the portion of the Defense of Marriage Act that provides that states may
choose not to recognize a same-sex marriage contracted in a sister state. 150 CONG. REC.
H6612 (daily ed. July 22, 2004). See also Richard Simon, House OKs Bill to Limit Federal
Court Rulings on Gay Marriage; The Legislation Would Protect States' Right to Decide
Whether to Accept Out-of-State Unions, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A18. Cf Henry Hart,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,
66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1402 (1953) (expressing strong reservations about the use of
jurisdiction-stripping measures to limit federal courts from effectively enforcing disfavored
constitutional rights); Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored
Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 129, 131-33 (1981) (describing
constitutional theory behind jurisdiction stripping schemes and questioning whether these
approaches comport with either Marbury or traditional understandings of the separation of
powers).
24. See e.g., Christopher Cox, The Marriage Amendment Is a Terrible Idea, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 28, 2004, at A22 (opinion article of U.S. Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA) voicing
concerns about the Federal Marriage Amendment as a federal intrusion into family law and
related areas: "For Republicans, who believe in federalism, the FMA is an uncomfortable
fit.... [T]his principle must be observed if our system of government is to function
properly."); Hulse, supra note 17 (reporting comments of Senator John McCain (R-AZ) in
opposing the Musgrove/Allard Amendment that the amendment is "'antithetical in every way
to the core philosophy of Republicans' because it interfered with states rights" in an area
traditionally thought of as a state function).
We suspect and readily concede that some of those making federalism-based
arguments in the same-sex marriage context are result-oriented rather than being motivated by
doctrinal purity. See Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304,
1306 (1999) (arguing that "federalism will be selectively invoked by courts only when
ideologically convenient, so that it has no authentic restraining power of its own"); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U.
C-tI. L. REV. 429, 429 & 474 n. 302 (2002) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court "has moved
aggressively to advance federalism ... [yet] it frequently proves more substantively
conservative than it does pro-federalism when deference to state processes would shield liberal
outcomes from federal reversal" and also noting that "judicial liberals' invocation of
constitutional federalism tends to be comparably strategic or result-oriented"); R. Randall
20051
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in an area of traditional state sovereignty. 25  It would not merely
constitutionalize the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), 26 but also
would partially displace the traditional role of the states in regulating
marriage. DOMA defined marriage for all federal purposes (such as, for
example, for social security benefits) 27 and attempted to ensure that no
state would be forced under the Full Faith and Credit Clause against its
will to recognize a same-sex marriage legally contracted in a sister
state. 28 In contrast, the Musgrave/Allard Amendment would preclude
any state from voluntarily recognizing as valid a same-sex marriage
contracted within its own borders and in accordance with its own
marriage laws. And, as noted earlier, some variations of the proposed
Federal Marriage Amendment go even further and seek to preclude any
legal recognition, at the federal or state level, of same-sex relationships.
Since the framing of the federal Constitution in 1787 and continuing
to the present, substantive family law matters have been reserved largely
to the states. 29 An amendment removing from the states the power to
Kelso, A Post-Conference Reflection on Federalism, Toleration, and Human Rights, 40 S.
TEX. L. REV. 811, 811-812 (1999) (commenting that "the political losers at the national level
often advocate and support the value of federalism" but conversely that "[t]he winners at the
national level typically like centralized authority" and citing examples from Mexico, South
Africa, Serbia, the United States, and the former Soviet Union). We think this does not detract
from the force of our state-sovereignty-centered arguments.
25. Indeed, former Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY) has publicly argued against the
Musgrave/Allard Amendment, suggesting that "it would unnecessarily undermine one of the
core principles I have always believed the GOP stood for: federalism." See Alan Simpson,
Missing the Point on Gays, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2003, at A21. Simpson notes that "[i]n our
system of government, laws affecting family life are under the jurisdiction of the states, not the
federal government, which is as it should be." Id.
26. See The Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 & 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
27. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) ("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of
the United States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or wife.").
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) ("No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession,
or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.").
29. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (noting that "domestic relations [is] an
area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States"); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878) ("The State... has absolute right to prescribe the conditions
upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for
which it may be dissolved."). But see Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA.
J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 541 (1998) (discussing ways in which family law has become increasingly
federalized); Ann Laquer Estin, Family Governance in the Age of Divorce, 1998 UTAH L.
REV. 211, 227 (asserting that "[ilncreasingly, for publicly governed families, the laws being
applied are generated by the national government" and that "[t]he shift toward national control
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include same-sex couples within their marriage laws would be a radical
departure from this traditional respect for state sovereignty.
As the Rehnquist Court has frequently reminded us, our federal
system of government is a bulwark of liberty. 30 The Framers created
discrete spheres of power for the federal and state governments to protect
citizens from arbitrary or tyrannical government; they achieved this
objective by dividing and separating government power and by providing
for laboratories of experimentation in the states. As Professor John Yoo
has argued, our federal system creates a kind of market for law that
encourages the states to "bid" for citizens by enacting a particular basket
of positive rights and duties. 31 Consistent with this position, Professor
Yoo has urged rejection of a federal marriage amendment because "[b]y
nationalizing marriage policy, the FMA undermines the benefits of
federalism, such as decisionmaking by local governments closer to the
people and competition among jurisdictions offering a diversity of
policies." 3
2
A meaningful commitment to federalism necessarily implies that
different states will reach different outcomes on various questions of
public and private morality. Do you desire access to legalized
prostitution? Well, Nevada is the place for you! 3 3 How about corporate
laws that minimize shareholder input and maximize management's de
facto control over the corporate entity? Delaware can handle it!
34
is most notable in the elaborate new federal mandates concerning child support enforcement").
30. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (noting that "where the
Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal
officials is diminished"); see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
31. See John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND.
L. REV. 27, 31-32, 36-37, 42-43 (1998); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1392-1404 (1997).
32. John C. Yoo & Anntim Vulchev, The Conservative Case Against the Federal
Marriage Amendment, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Aug. 2004, at
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss5/art3/.
33. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 201.310 et seq. & 244.345 (Michie 1995); see also
Micloe Bingham, Nevada Sex Trade: A Gamble for the Workers, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM,
69, 84-90 (1998) (discussing history and legal regime governing state-sanctioned prostitution
in Nevada); Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827, 928
n.352 (1999) (noting existence of legalized prostitution in Nevada).
34. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 §§ 101 et seq. (2003 & supp. 2005); see also William L.
Carey, Federalism & Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663-64
(1974); Daniel R. Fischcl, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 915 (1982); Jonathan
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate
Law, 65 TEx. L. REV. 469, 474, 476 (1987); Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical
Justifications and Tentative Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480,
2005]
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Would you like the option of physician assisted suicide should you
become terminally ill? Oregon permits this practice.
35
In short, states can and do adopt different sorts of police power laws
that regulate to protect the public health, safety, and morals. The
regulation of marriage is a classic police power issue that, as an historical
36Tofdrlzthreuainomatter, has been vested with the states. To federalize the regulation of
this area of family law would create a troubling precedent. If the
national government's newly discovered interest in protecting the
sanctity of marriage is sufficient to preempt state freedom to offer same-
sex marriage, this argues in favor of national preemption in other areas of
family law (such as divorce or child custody) and potentially in a host of
other areas traditionally left to state control-such as education,
gambling, or corporate law.37
What troubles us most about the proposed Federal Marriage
Amendment, however, is not simply that it would remove from state
control an issue traditionally reserved to the states. We are not troubled,
for example, by Loving v. Virginia, in which the Supreme Court in
essence held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses removed from state control the issue of whether or
not to allow interracial marriage. 38 Rather, what we find particularly
troubling with respect to the Federal Marriage Amendment as it concerns
state sovereignty is that it seeks to preempt states from expanding same-
sex equality before there has been an extended national debate on this
1481 n.14 (2002).
35. See The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REv. STAT. 127. 800 (2003); see also
Patrick M. Curran, Jr., Note, Regulating Death: Oregon's Death With Dignity Act and the
Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 86 GEO. L.J. 725, 729 (1998); Joseph Cordaro,
Note, Who Defers to Whom? The Attorney General Targets Oregon's Death with Dignity Act,
70 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2477, 2478 (2002).
36. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000) ("Petitioners' reasoning, more-
over, will not limit Congress to regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be ap-
plied equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the ag-
gregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childbearing on the national economy is undoubtedly
significant."); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 210-11 (1888) ("Marriage, as creating the
most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a peo-
ple than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature."); Reva
B. Siegal, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2201-05
(1996) (discussing the history and justifications for state control over family law, including the
rules regulating marriage, andnoting that "[t]he conviction that marriage is a matter for states
to regulate can also be traced to efforts to protect the common law of marital status from re-
form in the aftermath of the Civil War, an era when Congress was first beginning to exercise
its new power to regulate race discrimination in the states"); Note, American Wedding: Same-
Sex Marriage & the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93, 95 (1993) ("Marriage regula-
tion is traditionally the province of state legislatures.").
37. See supra text and accompanying notes 32-34.
38. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 11-12 (1967).
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issue and before an informed national consensus on this issue has
formed.
39
More generally, and to us more importantly, the Federal Marriage
Amendment (in whatever ultimate form) would represent a decided, and
we think unfortunate, break with our constitutional traditions in that the
U.S. Constitution historically has developed, both by amendment and by
judicial interpretation, in ways that draw ever more inclusive lines of
equality40 : since the Constitutional Convention in 1787, efforts to amend
39. See Stephen Clark, Progressive Federalism? A Gay Liberationist Perspective, 66
ALB. L. REV. 719, 743 (2003) (arguing that "perhaps the greatest risk to dissident progressive
interests is the possibility of national action precipitously and uniformly repudiating those
interests on a preemptive, nationwide basis before they gain a foothold anywhere"). The
United States Supreme Court's several decisions addressing the United States Constitution's
impact on state laws regulating the right to marry complicate the argument that the Federal
Marriage Amendment should be rejected because it represents a federal intrusion into a
traditional sphere of state sovereignty. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12-13 (1967) (holding that
Virginia statutes criminalizing and voiding interracial marriage violated Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of United States Constitution); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375-
77 (1978) (holding that Wisconsin statute prohibiting certain individuals who owed child
support from marrying violated Equal Protection Clause of United States Constitution); Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81, 82, 97-99 (1987) (holding that Missouri regulation prohibiting a
prison inmate from marrying without approval of prison superintendent impermissibly
burdened the constitutionally protected right to marry). Moreover, the state sovereignty
argument might be used to undermine same-sex equality if and when a federal court holds that
the federal Constitution compels the states to recognize same-sex marriage. For a debate on
the wisdom of progressives utilizing states' rights arguments to advance progressive causes,
compare Marc Spindelman, A Dissent from the Many Dissents from Attorney General
Ashcroft's Interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act, 19 IssUES L. & MED. 3, 41 (2003)
("Those familiar with the political lineage of states' rights should not be taken aback by the
idea that defending Oregon's assisted suicide law in the name of the states' authority to control
medical practice doesn't bode well for liberal goals.") with Clark, supra, at 723 (arguing that
"[t]he success of the gay rights movement in certain regions, and serious vulnerability at the
national level, suggests that support for a strong central government and opposition to
federalism or local control might be contrary to the cause" of gay and lesbian equality); see
also id. at 757 ("From the perspective of gay dissident progressives seeking safe harbor amid
alternating national impulses toward tolerant indifference and pointed hostility, a
conventionally progressive call for broad national power and increased centralization of public
policy may have little appeal. A theory of progressive federalism may suit our needs for
havens where we can organize a life around our own values and beliefs, however dissident.").
40. Indeed, one of the most powerful contemporary justifications for the power ofjudicial
review rests on promotion of the equality project. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); see also United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Professor Ely posits. "representation reinforcement" as
both a justification for and a substantive goal of judicial review of executive and legislative
actions. See Ely, supra, at 75-77, 87-88, 101-103. See generally id. at 135-79 (explaining
the operation of a process-oriented review wherein courts fix the system/democratic process
when it malfunctions). Because one cannot reasonably rely on the democratic process
routinely to protect the interests of "discrete and insular" minorities, federal courts should
scrutinize enactments or actions burdening such minorities with particular care. See id. at
116-17; see also John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial
Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451, 469 (1978) (stating that before Carolene Products, the Supreme
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the Constitution have been based on the notion that the document was
insufficiently protective of basic human rights. Most importantly,
beginning with the post-Civil War Amendments (the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments), the citizenry expanded the
nation's core notions of equality to prohibit the use of race as a basis for
withholding citizenship or extending only a second class form of
citizenship to persons on account of race.
The project of defining equality, however, remained incomplete.
Authoritative interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause excluded
women-and gender-based classifications-from the sphere of equality
protected by the concept of "equal protection of the laws." The
Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, partially remedied this
omission, and subsequent Justices came to understand the Equal
Protection mandate more broadly. Beginning in the 1970s and certainly
by the early 1980s, the Fourteenth Amendment itself came to be
generally understood to protect citizens against invidious discrimination
based on gender.
41
Court suggested that "at least in some situations judicial intervention becomes appropriate
when this expectation appears to have been betrayed and the existing processes of
representation seem inadequately fitted to the protection of deserving minority interests"). In
Carolene Products, the Supreme Court itself noted that "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. All of this helps to
establish the primacy of equality as both a principal objective of the Constitution and also as
an important theoretical justification for the power of judicial review. The federal courts
should use the Constitution, and the promise of equal protection in particular, to correct the
structural failure of democratic self-government to ensure that minorities receive
fundamentally fair treatment.
41. The Supreme Court first applied the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a gender-
based government classification in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Writing for a unanimous
Court, Chief Justice Burger applied a standard of rationality to an Idaho statute that
categorically preferred men over women for appointment as estate administrators: "[a]
classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' Id. at 76-77 (quoting Royster v. Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). The Reed Court found that Idaho's absolute preference
for male administrators "is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by
the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 76. Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973), Justice Brennan, in a plurality opinion, argued that gender-based classifications
are inherently suspect and, accordingly, merit strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 688. After
detailing the pervasive and deep-seated use of gender stereotypes to subordinate women
socially, politically, and economically, Justice Brennan opined that "we can only conclude that
classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national
origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at
688; see id. at 684-87. Justice Stewart merely concurred in the judgment, "agreeing that the
statutes before us work an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution." Id. at 691
(Stewart, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
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Other amendments, less dramatic and sweeping in scope, also have
expanded the domain of constitutionally protected equality. The
Twenty-Third Amendment, for example, extended voting rights in
Blackmun, concurred, objecting specifically to Justice Brennan's proposed standard of review.
Id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring) ("It is unnecesary for the Court in this case to
characterize sex as a suspect classification, with all of the far-reaching implications of such a
holding."). Accordingly, Justice Brennan was unable to garner a majority for his preferred
standard of review (i.e., strict scrutiny).
In subsequent cases during the 1970s, the Justices fought a protracted and inconclusive
battle over the proper standard of review for gender-based classifications. For example, in
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), Justice Brennan proposed an intermediate scrutiny
standard for such classifications: "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases
establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197. Although four
members of the Court joined Brennan's opinion, three of them, Justices Powell, Stevens, and
Stewart, all concurred specially and rejected intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard.
See id. at 210 (Powell, J., concurring) (expressing "reservations as to some of the discussion
concerning the appropriate standard for equal protection analysis" and endorsing Reed's "more
critical examination" approach); id. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that "[tihere is
only one Equal Protection Clause" and that "[i]t requires every State to govern impartially");
id. at 214-15 (Stewart, J., concurring) (declaring that the Oklahoma statute "amounts to total
irrationality" and therefore "amounts to invidious discrimination" under Reed). Cases decided
in the late 1970s and early 1980s failed to follow the intermediate scrutiny standard reliably.
See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981) (plurality opinion) (noting
that "[a]s is evident from our opinions, the Court has had some difficulty in agreeing upon the
proper approach and analysis in cases involving challenges to gender-based classifications"
and applying an enhanced rationality test); id. at 489 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("None of
the three opinions upholding the California statute fairly applies the equal protection analysis
this Court has so carefully developed since Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)."); Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352, 354 (1979) (plurality opinion) (arguing that prior cases establish
"the principle that a State is not free to make overbroad generalizations based on sex which are
entirely unrelated to any differences between men and women or which demean the ability or
social status of the affected class" and describing proper standard of review as whether "the
varying treatment of different groups of persons [based on gender] is so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the
legislature's actions were irrational"); cf id. at 359 (Powell, J., concurring) (rejecting
plurality's standard of review and positing that "[t]o withstand judicial scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause, gender-based distinctions must 'serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives') (quoting
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). In 1982, however, a clear majority of the Court,
led by Justice O'Connor, endorsed the intermediate scrutiny standard of review. See Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-26 (1982) (holding that Equal Protection
Clause requires government to justify use of gender-based classifications by establishing that
classification bears a substantial relationship to an important government interest). Since
Hogan, the Supreme Court routinely has applied intermediate level scrutiny to gender-based
classifications. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996)
(characterizing government's burden when attempting to justify a gender-based classification
as duty to proffer an "exceedingly persuasive" justification and stating that this requires
establishing that the classification bears a substantial relationship to an important government
interest); see generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and
1974 Terms, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1976) (discussing justifications for applying heightened
scrutiny to gender-based classifications).
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presidential elections to citizens of the District of Columbia; the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment abolished the use of poll taxes for federal elections;
and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment lowered the voting age for state and
federal elections to eighteen (thereby making it correspond to the age at
which young men could be drafted into the military service and sent to
fight in Vietnam). Although the relative importance of these
amendments pales in comparison to the significance of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments, they reflect a
continued and virtually unbroken practice of expanding-not
contracting-the scope of the Constitution's guarantee of equal
treatment.
The Eighteenth Amendment, which established Prohibition, is the
single counter-example to this overall trend. 42 Ratified in 1919, it
survived for less than fifteen years before being repealed by operation of
the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933. Because of its relatively quick
demise (to say nothing of the widespread non-compliance with
Prohibition while it was in force), the Eighteenth Amendment provides a
poor precedent for the Federal Marriage Amendment proposals. More
importantly, the Eighteenth Amendment did not aim to contract liberty in
matters "involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy." 43
It cannot be used comfortably as precedent, therefore, for the Federal
Marriage Amendment proposals, which seek to contract the protections
42. To be sure, other constitutional amendments arguably curtailed liberty, albeit in a
significantly less direct fashion than the Eighteenth Amendment. For example, the Sixteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1913, which permits Congress to lay and collect direct taxes on
personal income, without apportionment among the states, U.S. CONST. amend. XVI,
facilitated the loss of property (i.e., the property used to meet personal income tax obligations).
See id. Similarly, the Eleventh Amendment, which limited the jurisdiction of the Article III
courts by excluding "suit[s] in law or equity" if brought against a state by "Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State," precluded would-be federal court
litigants from bringing suits in federal, as opposed to state, court. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see
also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9-11, 21 (1890) (extending state sovereign immunity to
include suits brought against a state by its own citizens, notwithstanding the lack of a textual
predicate for such an extension). Neither of these amendments, however, directly established a
particular social policy or purported to resolve a specific question of social morality-which
the Eighteenth Amendment, by way of contrast, attempted to accomplish. One also could
posit that the Civil War Amendments curtailed liberty-the liberty of slave owners and those
who directly benefited from the practice of human chattel slavery. But these amendments, the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, did so by directly expanding the liberty of
the Freedmen. By way of contrast, the Eighteenth Amendment did not expand anyone's
liberty-teetotalers were free to abstain before ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment and
remained so after its repeal through ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment; only the
liberty of tipplers was at issue.
43. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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of the federal and state constitutions for intimate family relations.
44
We begin, then, with the observation that the Federal Marriage
Amendment proposals represent a break with both the American
tradition of expanding the scope of protected equality and with the
tradition generally respecting state control over domestic relations.
Suppose, however, that neither of these objections proves persuasive to
proponents of the Federal Marriage Amendment. Suppose that the
amendment's proponents value prohibiting formal legal recognition of
same-sex unions more highly than respecting traditions of expanding
equality and traditions of reserving police power questions to the states.
Would a Federal Marriage Amendment actually have the desired effect
of preserving heterosexual marriage while precluding any meaningful
judicial recognition of same-sex relationships? In our view, arguably it
would not.
The ideals of equal protection of the laws and due process are
deeply embedded in the Constitution, from the initial insistence on
inclusion of the Bill of Rights through subsequent expansion of the
meanings of equality and due process. An amendment that would
challenge the substance of existing constitutional protections and the
process of flexible expansion of such rights both flies in the face of the
substantive tradition of constitutional amendment and invites narrow
interpretations that would undercut the purposes of such an amendment
in order to incorporate it into the large body of constitutional
interpretation. Precisely because such an amendment would conflict
with likely interpretations of such basic rights as equal protection and
due process without expressly repealing the Equal Protection Clause or
Due Process Clause, it would pose unique challenges for constitutional
interpretation.
In Part I of this Article, we explore the Supreme Court's approach
to integrating new amendments into the existing constitutional text.
Some general principles suggest that the most prominent Federal
Marriage Amendment proposals, as written, would not necessarily
achieve their objectives. For example, the Supreme Court has refused to
imply from later amendments the repeal of constitutional rights absent
express language calling for that result. In addition, the adoption of an
44. It bears emphasis that the Eighteenth Amendment represents the only constitutional
amendment that sets out to restrict or repeal pre-existing legal rights. As former Senator Alan
Simpson has argued, "it is surely not the tradition in this country to try to amend the
Constitution in ways that restrict liberty." Simpson, supra note 25. As he has noted, "[a]ll of
our amendments have been designed to expand the sphere of freedom, with one notorious
exception: prohibition" and "[w]e all know how that absurd federal power grab turned out."
Id.
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amendment directly addressing a particular subject has not precluded the
Court from using another amendment to expand rights beyond the limits
of the more specific amendment. Finally, there are such broad, open-
ended clauses in the federal Constitution that precluding recognition or
protection of same-sex couples would require the adoption of a much
more broadly worded amendment than any current version of the Federal
Marriage Amendment represents.
In Part II of this Article, we apply these principles to a discussion of
the effect of two proposed versions of the Federal Marriage Amendment.
We conclude that these principles suggest that when confronted with an
amendment that discriminates on the basis of gender, the Supreme Court
plausibly might interpret the amendment narrowly so as to harmonize the
amendment to the greatest extent possible with a Constitution that calls
for equal protection and due process. We also conclude that these
principles of constitutional interpretation suggest that a future Supreme
Court, when so inclined, would be able to utilize the Equal Protection
Clause to ensure equality for same-sex couples despite adoption of either
version of the Federal Marriage Amendment.
With respect to the Musgrave/Allard Amendment, for example, a
future Court, when confronted with an amendment that purports to
proscribe judicial compulsion of same-sex marriage or the incidents
thereof, would still be free to order that the state choose between
providing the incidents of marriage to all couples regardless of sex and
providing the incidents of marriage to none. Note that this remedy does
not, as a technical matter, require that the state confer the legal incidents
of marriage on same-sex couples. The state would be free to stop
discriminating by withdrawing the incidents of marriage from mixed-sex
married couples.
Alternatively, the Court might hold that a separate but equal scheme
in which the state sanctions mixed-sex marriage but bans same-sex
marriage is inherently unequal and in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, regardless of whether or not the
state offers the incidents of marriage under a different name to same-sex
couples. The principles of constitutional interpretation that we discuss in
Part I suggest that the Court, when confronted with an amendment that
expressly defines marriage in the United States as only between one man
and one woman, could then order the state out of the business of
sanctioning marriage.
45
45. Between August and November 2004, thirteen states amended their constitutions to
ban state recognition of same-sex marriages. See Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Bans Fuel
Conservative Agenda, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at A39; Adam Liptak, Caution in Court for
Gay Rights Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2004, at A16. The states include Arkansas,
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In order for those opposed to equal rights for same-sex couples to
ensure that the state continues to sanction mixed-sex marriage and only
mixed-sex marriage, they must do more than establish a prohibitory
amendment targeting "marriage" for special protection. Indeed, in Part
III of the Article, we argue that in light of the principles of constitutional
interpretation we discuss, nothing short of an amendment that expressly
repeals in part the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment might do. This drastic step-repealing the
protections of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses-is, of
course, what the proponents of a Federal Marriage Amendment
implicitly have proposed.
To be clear, we do not wish to see any repeal of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. And we
believe that any attempt to expressly repeal in part the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses would be
wildly unpopular politically. We urge a truth-in-amending approach
because we believe the American people should know what, at its
essence, the proponents of a Federal Marriage Amendment really hope to
achieve. And we believe that absent such truth-in-amending, the
Supreme Court would be entirely justified in reading a Federal Marriage
Amendment as narrowly as possible to leave intact the full force of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal
protection.
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah. Cooperman, supra. Eight of these state constitutional
amendments also banned state recognition of civil unions or domestic partnerships. See
Liptak, supra ("Eight of the 11 new state amendments address both gay marriage and civil
unions."); Cooperman, supra ("The wording of amendments varies widely. In four states-
Montana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Oregon-the language applies only to same-sex marriage.
In the rest of the states [Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah], it also could bar civil unions or domestic partnership
arrangements that confer health insurance, hospital visitation rights and other benefits on
same-sex couples."). These states join Alaska and Nevada, which previously had adopted state
constitutional amendments banning state recognition of same-sex marriage, and Nebraska,
which previously had adopted a state constitutional amendment banning both same-sex
marriage and civil unions and domestic partnerships. Although the tradition of interpreting a
particular state constitution might well depart from the federal example, the same judicial
responses to a state amendment banning same-sex marriage might still be available: a
constitutional ban on same-sex marriage might not preclude arguments premised on provisions
in state constitutions guaranteeing due process, equal protection, or protections against sex
discrimination.
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I. INTEGRATING CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS INTO EXISTING
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
The Supreme Court's approach to the interpretive task of integrating
new amendments into the nation's Foundational Document reveals that
new amendments must be very specific to ensure that the Justices
construe them to repeal pre-existing constitutional rights. Moreover, the
presence of a specific amendment addressing a particular topic does not
appear to invalidate claims related to that topic arising under other, more
general constitutional provisions.
Why this should be so as a matter of constitutional interpretation is
far from clear. As a general rule of statutory interpretation, an enactment
later in time, addressing a specific question, should control over an older
enactment, treating the subject matter more generally.46 Regardless of
whether the Supreme Court's approach is the most logical one (at least
from a statutory interpretation point of view), this methodology has held
true with respect to the effects of several amendments. Below we
illustrate this methodology with the cases of the Twenty-First,
Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments.
A. The Case of the Twenty-First Amendment
The Supreme Court has a history of reading new amendments
46. See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS § 53, at 116-18 (1896) (stating canon that specific statutes
control over more general statutes); id. at § 135, at 363--64 (stating that statutes should be
harmonized when possible, but "if there is an irreconciliable repugnancy between different
parts or sections, that which was last adopted or enacted must prevail"); EARL T. CRAWFORD,
THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 137, at 196-97 (1940) (explaining that when statutory
texts conflict, the last enacted provision should control "on the ground that the last expression
of the legislative will should prevail"); id. at § 230, at 429-30 (stating that when statutes
conflict, the more specific statute should govern over the more general statute, because "the
specific statute more clearly evidences the legislative intent than the general statute does"); see
also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 43,229, 232 (1994)
(stating rule that specific statute controls over more general statute and critiquing cases
applying the rule); id. at 278-79 (describing and characterizing canons of statutory
construction as being textual, substantive, or related to the treatment of extrinsic sources);
KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 201-11 (1999)
(describing and critiquing the canons of statutory interpretation); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 739 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(stating and applying canons). For a classic and trenchant critique of the canons of statutory
construction, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VANDERBILT L. REV. 395, 401-
406 (1950). For a more sympathetic treatment of the canons of statutory interpretation, see
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW: AN ESSAY 24-29, 44-47 (1996).
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narrowly. Take, for example, the Twenty-First Amendment. The
Twenty-First Amendment repealed Prohibition, but authorized states to
regulate alcoholic beverages: "[t]he transportation or importation into
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited."'47 On its face, this language seems to authorize broad state
regulation of the use and consumption of alcoholic beverages.
Yet, in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,48 the Supreme Court found
that Hawaii could not favor locally-produced alcoholic beverages over
those produced in other states or nations. "State laws that constitute
mere economic protectionism are ... not entitled to the same deference
as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in
liquor."49 The dormant Commerce Clause, a function of Article I, § 8,
cl. 3, prohibits taxes or regulations that facially discriminate against
interstate or international commerce. 50 The most logical interpretation of
the Twenty-First Amendment, which was enacted in 1933 (almost 150
years after Article I, § 8, cl. 3), would be that it empowers states to
regulate alcoholic beverages comprehensively. But the Supreme Court
has not seen it that way.
Similarly, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,51 the Supreme
Court roundly rejected the suggestion that states could regulate alcohol
advertising more aggressively than other kinds of advertising because of
the Twenty-First Amendment. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
declared that the Twenty-First Amendment did not work a pro tanto
repeal of the First or Fourteenth Amendments: "the First Amendment
directs that government may not suppress speech as easily as it may
suppress conduct, and that speech restrictions cannot be treated as simply
another means that the government may use to achieve its ends." 52 In
other words, the scope of state authority under section two of the
Twenty-First Amendment has been read narrowly-it is modified by
other, pre-existing constitutional provisions, rather than controlling over
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
48. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
49. Id. at 276.
50. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 574-77
(1997) (invalidating, on dormant Commerce Clause grounds, a Maine property tax scheme that
favored Maine charities serving in-state, rather than out-of-state, residents); New Energy Co.
v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988) (invalidating, on dormant Commerce Clause grounds,
an Ohio tax scheme that granted tax benefits based on state of origin of ethanol); Bacchus Im-
ports, Ltd. 468 U.S. at 268 (invalidating, on dormant Commerce Clause grounds, a discrimina-
tory excise tax exemption that favored alcoholic beverages produced in state over those pro-
duced out-of-state).
51. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
52. Id. at 512.
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them.
53
B. The Nineteenth Amendment and Gender Equality
In a series of cases decided in the 1870s, the Supreme Court
rejected the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment protected women as a
class against gender-based discrimination. Suffragettes who attempted to
vote in violation of local laws in states like New York were arrested,
tried, and convicted of voting fraud.54 Although West Virginia could not
53. One should note that the Supreme Court currently has pending before it a case that
could implicate the continuing validity of Bacchus Imports. See Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517
(6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part by, sub nom. Granholm v. Heald, 124 S. Ct. 2389 (2004)
and cert. granted in part by, sub nom. Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n. v. Heald,
124 S. Ct. 2389 (2004). The Sixth Circuit, applying Bacchus Imports, invalidated a Michigan
state law that permitted the direct shipment of Michigan-produced beers, wines, and liquors to
individual consumers, but prohibited the direct shipment of such beverages to Michigan
residents from out-of-state producers. Id. at 520-21; cf Beskind v. Easley, 325 F. 3d 506,
509-10, 517 (4th Cir. 2003) (invalidating, on dormant Commerce Clause grounds and over
North Carolina's invocation of the Twenty-First Amendment, a North Carolina statute
permitting local producers of alcoholic beverages to ship directly to North Carolina residents
while prohibiting such direct shipments from out-of-state producers). The Justices limited
their grant of certiorari in the Michigan case to a single question: "Does a State's regulatory
scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the
ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant commerce clause in light of Sec. 2
of the Twenty-First Amendment?" See 124 S.Ct. at 2389. In the 1970s and 1980s, the
Supreme Court invoked the Twenty-First Amendment to sustain restrictions on nude or erotic
dancing in establishments serving alcohol. See New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452
U.S. 714, 715-18 (1981); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114-15, 118-19 (1972); but cf
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272-76 (1984) (refusing to extend Bellanca and
LaRue to case raising a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to Hawaii law favoring local
producers of alcoholic beverages, on theory that Hawaiian law did not implicate "core
concerns" of the Twenty-First Amendment). In the late 1990s, however, the Justices squarely
rejected the notion that the power to regulate alcohol worked a pro tanto repeal of the First
Amendment. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 514-16 (disavowing rationale of Bellanca and
LaRue and applying First Amendment principles to state law prohibiting advertising featuring
prices for alcoholic beverages). 44 Liquormart endorsed the Bacchus Imports approach to the
Twenty-First Amendment: the Twenty-First Amendment would not be read to repeal, by
implication, other provisions of the Constitution. See id. (rejecting broad reading of the
Twenty-First Amendment, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, where state attempted to invoke
Twenty-First Amendment to override free speech rights protected under the First
Amendment). Cf Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 274-76 (rejecting State's argument that
its violation of the Commerce Clause was "saved" by the Twenty-First Amendment, noting
that the "central purpose" of the Amendment "was not to empower States to favor local liquor
industries by erecting barriers to competition"). But see id. at 286-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Twenty-First Amendment should be read to give states wide discretion to
regulate the sale and importation of alcoholic beverages without regard to other, pre-existing,
provisions of the Constitution, including the Commerce Clause). It is possible, though not
likely, that the Supreme Court will revisit its current approach to the Twenty-First Amendment
in the Granholm/Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass 'n litigation.
54. Over a dozen women, including Susan B. Anthony, were arrested after attempting to
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bar African-American men from sitting on juries,55 New York could
condition voting rights on being male. 6 Similarly, Illinois could prohibit
women from joining the bar because "[t]he paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother." 57  This interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
precipitated a sustained national effort to amend the Constitution again,
this time to convey expressly the right of suffrage on women as a class.
In 1920, the states ratified the Nineteenth Amendment, which
expressly prohibits withholding voting rights on the basis of gender:
"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."58 The
clear implication of the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment is that
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause has nothing to say
about gender-based classifications; moreover, the need for the
Nineteenth Amendment suggests a settled understanding that, absent an
amendment, a state would be perfectly entitled to limit voting rights to
men.
Even the Warren Court, generally considered to have held a
remarkably broad commitment to enforcing equal protection principles,
59
generally failed to question gender-based discriminations. Hoyt v.
Florida6 ° provides an instructive example. Florida privileged its female
citizens by providing a categorical exemption from jury service.61 The
Warren Court sustained this facial gender-based discrimination against
an equal protection challenge as an appropriate gender-based
"privilege." 62
Yet, beginning in the early 1970s, the Supreme Court revisited the
vote in the 1872 presidential election in New York. See BARBARA A. BABCOCK, ET AL., SEX
DISCRIMINATION & TIE LAW 8-9 (1975); Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, The History of the
Women's Suffrage Movement, 49 VAND. L. REv. 657, 661-62 (1996). The Supreme Court of
the United States, in a case originating in St. Louis, Missouri, subsequently held that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not proscribe gender-based discrimination or convey universal
suffrage to all persons. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (upholding,
against equal protection challenge, state laws restricting suffrage to men); see also Bradwell v.
State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 138-39 (1873) (upholding, against equal protection challenge,
state law prohibiting women from becoming attorneys).
55. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 305-10 (1879) (invalidating,
on equal protection grounds, West Virginia law that facially excluded African American men
from jury service based on their race).
56. See Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 170-72, 176-78.
57. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
59. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
61. Seeid. at58.
62. See id. at 60-65.
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issue of gender-based classifications. Starting with Reed v. Reed,63 and
progressing through Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,64 the
Justices began to review gender-based classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause for rationality.65 Over time, the rationality review
became more demanding, and this more demanding standard of review
morphed into intermediate scrutiny review.
66
Today, to survive challenge, a gender-based classification must bear
a substantial relationship to an important government interest.67  The
government's burden is a heavy one; the standard presupposes the
existence of "an exceedingly persuasive justification" for the use of the
gender-based shorthand.
68
If one applies standard canons of statutory interpretation, the
Supreme Court's gender cases make no sense. The authoritative
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, rendered within a few years
of its ratification, categorically rejected the idea that it imposed any
limits whatsoever on gender-based classifications---even gender-based
classifications affecting a fundamental right (suffrage). The enactment
of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 should have resolved any doubts
about the continuing validity of this interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Had substantial doubts existed regarding the scope of the Equal
Protection Clause, a simple revision in case law, rather than a
constitutional amendment, would have enfranchised women.
The lesson here is quite clear: the Supreme Court does not hold
itself bound to traditional canons of statutory interpretation when
interpreting constitutional text. Events subsequent to 1920 greatly
expanded the scope and meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Most
63. 404 U.S. 71(1971).
64. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
65. For a discussion of these cases and the evolution of the Supreme Court's standard of
review for gender-based classifications, see supra note 41.
66. Some commentators touted Reed v. Reed almost immediately as in fact a greater-
than-rationality review of sex-based classifications. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1972) (arguing that "[o]nly by importing some special suspicion of sex-
related means from the new equal protection area can the result [in Reed v. Reed] be made
entirely persuasive"). In fact, the Justices failed to reach a settled consensus regarding the
precise standard of review applicable to gender-based classifications for almost a decade after
Reed. Individual Justices advocated various standards, from strict scrutiny, to intermediate
scrutiny, to some form of enhanced rationality review. See supra note 41. By the early 1980s,
however, the Supreme Court had settled on intermediate scrutiny as the applicable standard of
review: to survive judicial scrutiny, a gender-based classification must bear a substantial
relationship to an important government interest. See id.
67. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-26 (1982).
68. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524.
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importantly, the Brown v. Board of Education decision read the clause to
prohibit invidious forms of racial discrimination.69 The language of the
desegregation cases rejected racism, but also rejected irrational
government action that denigrates or oppresses classes of citizens
without reason.7°
To the extent that gender classifications attempted to denigrate and
disempower women simply on the basis of their gender, it seemed odd to
hold that the Equal Protection Clause had no impact at all. If one
generalized the promise of equal protection into a freedom from
irrational government classifications, 71  then the use of gender
represented a problematic means of granting or withholding benefits.
Over time, the notion of equal protection became more generalized and
de-coupled from its core animating purpose (eradication of race-based
classifications). The broader, more generalized understanding of equal
protection made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Supreme Court to
cast a blind eye on invidious gender-based classifications.
72
The expansion of equal protection principles in the 1970s was
remarkable in another sense too: contemporaneously with the Supreme
Court's expansion of equal protection principles to disallow gender
classifications, the states were considering whether to ratify the Equal
Rights Amendment ("ERA").73 The ERA said directly that equal rights
69. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
70. See id. at 494-95; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) ("Segregation
in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it
imposes on negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause."); Korematsu v. U.S. 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions;
racial antagonism never can."); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) ("We think the
attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question to a person of color was not a le-
gitimate exercise of the police power of the State, and is in direct violation of the fundmental
law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference
with property rights except by due process of law.").
71. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-09 (2000); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging
Jurisprudence of Oprah!, 90 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2121-23 (2002).
72. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
176-78 (1996) (arguing that sexual orientation discrimination reflects irrational prejudice that
is every bit as deep seated as race and gender bias).
73. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)
("There is another, and I find compelling, reason for deferring a general categorizing of sex
classifications as invoking the strictest test ofjudicial scrutiny. The Equal Rights Amendment,
which if adopted will resolve the substance of this precise question, has been approved by the
Congress and submitted for ratification by the States. If this Amendment is duly adopted, it
will represent the will of the people accomplished in a manner prescribed by the Constitution.
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could not be denied or abridged on the basis of sex-it generalized the
equality guarantee contained in the Nineteenth Amendment.
74
At least to some extent, the Supreme Court preempted the
amendment process by interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to
disallow invidious gender-based classifications. Viewed most charitably,
perhaps the Justices saw that a social consensus against invidious gender-
based classifications had come into existence, making such
classifications inherently suspect.
75
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, 7
6 two-
third majorities of both the House and Senate had adopted the ERA, and
many states quickly ratified the amendment. 77 In defining "irrational" or
"arbitrary" government action, the Justices could logically look to the
ERA and Title VII as empirical support for the idea that gender-based
discrimination no longer enjoyed general support with the citizenry. As
Professor Laurence Tribe stated almost two decades ago, "[tfhe concept
of equality before the law regardless of gender has simply become too
much a part of our culture for the ultimate outcome to be much in
doubt."
78
By acting prematurely and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has assumed a decisional
responsibility at the very time when state legislatures, functioning within the traditional
democratic process, are debating the proposed Amendment.").
74. In relevant part, the ERA provided that "[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." H.R.J. Res. 208,
92nd Cong. § 1 (1971).
75. Note that some commentators take a broader view of the Court's motivation. See,
e.g., David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv. L. Rev.
1457, 1478 (2001) (arguing that "[w]hat 'ratified' the ERA, in effect, was... insistent
pressure from society as a whole.... Instead of saying that the courts imposed an agenda on
society, it is probably more accurate to say that the opposite occurred: because of
developments in society, the Court would have found it very difficult to continue treating
gender classifications as unproblematic"). See also Reva B. Siegel, Social Movements and
Law Reform: Text in Context: Gender and the Constitution From a Social Movement
Perspective, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 297, 308 (2001) ("But if we widen our angle of vision, we
might view mobilization of women for constitutional change as the source of the new
understanding that informed judicial interpretation of the Constitution in the 1970s.").
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000) (providing that "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer.. . to fail or refuse to hire ... or otherwise to
discriminate... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin")
(emphasis added).
77. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-30, at 1586-87
(2d ed. 1988) (discussing the legislative history and subsequent ratification debates
surrounding the ERA); see also Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change:
Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REv. 386, 393 (1983) (discussing ratification
process surrounding ERA and uncertain legal effects of attempted rescissions of state
ratifications).
78. TRIBE, supra note 77, § 16-30, at 1587.
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Although Tribe predicted that "this ERA, or its functional
equivalent, will one day be passed by Congress and ratified by the
states," 79 the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause has effectively achieved the ERA's objectives. 80
The contemporary consensus that gender-based discrimination
represents a fundamental injustice displaced the original understanding
of the Equal Protection Clause and both the text and the legislative
history of the Nineteenth Amendment. 81 Even an amendment that
assumed the continuing validity of a limited reading of an earlier
amendment was not sufficient to stop the Supreme Court from re-
interpreting the earlier amendment to expand and advance the equality
project.
C. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment and Poll Taxes
In 1964, the states ratified the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which
prohibits poll taxes as a precondition to voting in federal elections. The
amendment is entirely silent about the legal status of poll taxes for state
and local elections; in order to secure easier ratification of the
amendment, its framers elected to limit its effect to federal elections.
A scant two years later, in 1966, the Supreme Court used the Equal
Protection Clause to invalidate poll taxes in state and local elections.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that government
must offer an "exceedingly persuasive justification" to adopt and enforce a gender-based
classification and effectively requiring state to admit any woman capable of completing
Virginia Military Institute's program to that program without regard to gender).
Some commentators have argued that there is still a need for a federal equal rights amendment.
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARv. L. REV. 947, 949 (2002) (stating that "the sex
discrimination paradigm remains limited, in constitutional legitimacy and critical acuity, by
the ahistorical manner in which the Court derived it from the law of race discrimination");
Patricia Thompson, The Equal Rights Amendment: The Merging of Jurisprudence and Social
Acceptance, 30 W. ST. U. L. REV. 205, 215 (2003) (discussing "credible attacks" on
"piecemeal legislative reform" because of its vulnerability to "subjective interpretation"); Joan
A. Lukey & Jeffrey A. Smagula, Do We Still Need a Federal Equal Rights Amendment?, 44
B. B.J. 10, 11 (2000) (arguing that "[t]his 'piecemeal' approach to equal rights via legislation
and state constitutional provisions stands in contrast to the wide-spread, national impact which
would likely result from a federal equal rights amendment. Most significantly, such an
amendment would create a federal standard of strict scrutiny for gender classifications, which
almost inevitably evolve into a uniform state standard as well").
81. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-2, 6-18, 21-23 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court
generally does not make grossly counter-majoritarian decisions, but rather tends to ratify
developing social trends that enjoy substantial support among the nation's citizens).
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Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,82 under the rubric of equal
protection, accomplished precisely what the Twenty-Fourth Amendment
did not do.83 Voting rights are fundamental and a state may not withhold
the fundamental right to vote without a compelling reason; a desire to
raise revenue does not meet this burden.
In the absence of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, this interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment might be tenable. Even if the original
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause did not disallow poll taxes
(unless imposed on a facially racial basis), subsequent changes might
have justified a reevaluation of this question. The enactment of the
Nineteenth Amendment, for example, suggests a growing commitment to
equal suffrage. Voting rights laws, passed initially in the Reconstruction
Era, took on new importance in the 1950s. Moreover, Congress
legislated in the 1950s and 1960s to safeguard voting rights. 84 The
Supreme Court could have made an argument that against this
background, states could no longer justify the imposition of poll taxes as
a precondition to voting.
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, however, changes the situation
quite considerably. When Congress and the states act to amend the
Constitution, but limit the amendment to a particular aspect of a larger
problem, the Supreme Court arguably should not expand the scope of the
amendment under the rubric of a pre-existing amendment. If poll taxes
for state and local elections violate the Fourteenth Amendment, so too
did poll taxes as applied to federal elections violate constitutional equal
protection principles. Congress and the states were evidently mistaken in
their belief that an amendment was really necessary to abolish poll taxes
as applied to federal elections. As with the ERA and gender-based
classifications, the Supreme Court was more interested in advancing the
twin causes of equality of citizenship and racial justice than with hewing
carefully to traditional rules of statutory interpretation.
The pattern seems very clear indeed: as an historical matter, the
Supreme Court has established a very consistent practice of declining to
interpret new constitutional amendments broadly to repeal or limit the
scope of prior amendments. If the Justices come to believe that a
particular practice, once viewed as constitutional, is no longer so, the
history of subsequent amendments will not affect their willingness to
82. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
83. Id. at 665-69.
84. See, e.g., The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 19 7 3 -1 9 7 3 p (2000); see also
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum
Analysis, 104 YALE L.J. 1411, 1412-13 (1995) (discussing history surrounding enactment of
the Voting Rights Act).
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announce and enforce the broader interpretation of the pre-existing right.
So it is that gender classifications can be seen as equal protection
violations; so it is that state power to regulate alcohol remains limited by
Article I, § 8, the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment; so it is
that a limited repeal of poll taxes can be expanded to abolish poll taxes
comprehensively.
II. THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DISSONANCE
In this Part, we consider two versions of a Federal Marriage
Amendment, each at opposite ends of the spectrum concerning respect
for state sovereignty in matters of domestic relations. The first version
of the Federal Marriage Amendment is respectful of state sovereignty
and purports merely to affirm constitutionally the Defense of Marriage
Act. The second version, at the other end of the spectrum, is maximally
intrusive on state sovereignty.85  It not only constitutionalizes a
definition of marriage for all purposes as between only one man and one
woman but also precludes any state from enacting any marriage statute
that differs from that definition. We then analyze how the Supreme
Court might interpret these proposed amendments in light of the existing
Constitution. We conclude that neither version of the Federal Marriage
Amendment would preclude a future Supreme Court from holding that a
state's failure to recognize same-sex marriage while recognizing mixed-
sex marriage constitutes invidious sex discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.
We evaluate and find unpersuasive arguments that discrimination
against same-sex couples is not impermissible sex discrimination
because such discrimination applies equally to men and to women, and
because such discrimination is not animated by hostility directed at either
sex. We further argue that, depending on the version of the Federal
Marriage Amendment under consideration, the Court might then order
the state to offer the incidents of marriage to same-sex couples, might
85. We do not consider an even more extreme version of the Federal Marriage
Amendment that would ban any federal or state legislative or judicial recognition or protection
of any same-sex relationship. Although such an amendment is the preferred alternative for
some movement conservatives, we think it completely beyond the realm of political
possibilities. See Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Being Retooled, WASH. POST,
Mar. 23, 2004, at A4 (reporting on a press conference given by key sponsors of a proposed
Federal Marriage Amendment in which the sponsors announced that they would revise the
pending amendment to make clear that it would allow states to enact civil unions for same-sex
couples).
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order the state to choose between offering marriage to both same-sex
couples and mixed-sex couples on equal terms and offering marriage to
no one, or might order the state to cease recognizing marriage altogether.
A. The Federal Marriage Amendment, Sex Discrimination, and
Equal Protection
A version of the Federal Marriage Amendment that is respectful of
state control of domestic relations might attempt to ensure that no federal
court would hold the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional. DOMA
provides that for federal purposes the definition of marriage is only a
marriage between one man and one woman.
86
DOMA further purports to exercise Congress's power to enforce the
Full Faith and Credit Clause by providing that no state shall have to
recognize a same-sex marriage contracted in another state. 87 This latter
portion of DOMA could be considered pro-states' rights in that it
protects the rights of a state to make its own decision on the same-sex
marriage issue.
To guard against the possibility that a federal court might invalidate
the Defense of Marriage Act, a Federal Marriage Amendment might
provide: "Congress shall have the authority to define marriage for federal
purposes. Moreover, Congress shall have the power under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to regulate the extent to which a state must recognize a
same-sex marriage contracted in another state." A virtue (or
shortcoming, depending on one's point of view) of this version of the
constitutional amendment is that it would not require a repealing
amendment for Congress to recognize same-sex marriage or for
Congress to require one state to recognize a same-sex marriage
contracted in another state should Congress decide to so require at some
86. Under the DOMA:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
87. Accordingly,
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
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time in the future. It allows the "people's voice [to] be heard," 88 not just
today, but for generations to come. This flexible approach is essentially
the avenue taken by the people of Hawaii in amending their state
constitution in 1998 to prevent the Hawaii Supreme Court from
interpreting the Hawaiian constitution as requiring the state to provide
for same-sex marriage.
89
An amendment that merely purports to allow the federal
government to define marriage for federal purposes and to prescribe the
effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, however, will not affect the
continuing validity of substantive due process, equal protection, or other
state constitutional rights (such as a right of privacy).
For example, although the amendment would likely preclude courts
from ordering the federal government to recognize same-sex marriage
per se, the amendment would not necessarily preclude the courts from
ordering the states to recognize same-sex marriage, both those contracted
within their own borders and those contracted in a sister state, under the
Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Even if one interpreted the amendment more broadly as having the
effect of precluding the courts from ordering the federal government or
the states to recognize "same-sex marriage," the amendment probably
would not prevent federal and state courts from demanding equal
treatment for same-sex couples on a program-by-program or across-the-
board basis. Thus, if the military provides a stipend upon the death of a
service member to a surviving spouse, it is entirely conceivable that
equal protection principles might require either that the benefit be
provided to a domestic partner or that no benefit be provided at all.
We believe an entirely plausible vehicle for circumnavigating the
DOMA amendment would be the Equal Protection Clause's ban on
invidious sex discrimination. A compelling argument exists that
allowing mixed-sex marriage but not allowing same-sex marriage is sex
discrimination. The argument begins with the assertion that a marriage
law that limits marriage to one man and one woman classifies according
to sex.90
88. President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State
of the Union (Jan. 20, 2004) (stating that "[o]n an issue of such great consequence [marriage],
the people's voice must be heard").
89. See HAw. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (providing that "[tlhe legislature shall have the power
to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.").
90. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay
Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 208 (1994) ("As a matter of definition, if
the same conduct is prohibited or stigmatized when engaged in by a person of one sex, while it
is tolerated when engaged in by a person of the other sex, then the party imposing the
prohibition or stigma is discriminating on the basis of sex."); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality
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The effect of such a sex-based classification is that an individual is
prohibited from entering into a particular marriage because of her sex.
That the legal limitation doubly classifies according to sex does not
negate the sex-based classification: 91 that the prohibition is dependent
also on the sex of her proposed marriage partner does not alter the fact
that the individual is subject to a prohibition that she would not be
subject to were she of the other sex. 92 If one cannot tell whether a statute
prohibits a particular behavior by an individual until one knows the sex
of that individual, the statute classifies according to sex.
93
This argument has gained some acceptance in the recent trilogy of
state supreme court opinions advancing the cause of gay marriage. 94 The
plurality opinion in Baehr v. Lewin, and concurring opinions in Baker v.
State, and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health adopted the view
that limiting marriage to mixed sex couples constitutes discrimination on
the basis of sex. 95 The recent concurring opinion of Justice Greaney in
and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187, 230 (labeling this argument
"powerful"). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95
MICH. L. REv. 203, 205 n. 7 (1996) (noting that "a ban on gay marriage requires formal sex
labeling" just as "[a] ban on interracial marriage requires formal race labeling").
91. See Stephen Clark, Same-Sex But Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation Analogy,
34 RUTGERS L. J. 107, 140-142 (2002) (arguing that discrimination against same-sex couples
is "sex-plus" discrimination); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 72, at 162-82 (making equal
protection argument premised on Loving).
92. Clark, supra note 91, at 138 ("Whenever a discriminator targets a couple for
disfavored treatment because the two people comprising the couple are the same or different in
terms of a protected trait, the discrimination is based on that protected trait."); see ESKRIDGE,
supra note 72, at 161 ("A classification-based attack on bars to same-sex marriage is
straightforward because the bars classify according to sex. I am a man. Therefore, I am barred
from marrying another man while permitted to marry a woman.").
93. See Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex
Discrimination, 98 YALE L. J. 145, 151 (1988) ("McLaughlin stands for the proposition
(which should be obvious even without judicial support) that if a statute defines prohibited
conduct by reference to a characteristic, then the statute is not neutral with respect to that
characteristic.").
94. Social conservatives might find a silver lining to this cloud of judicial acceptance of
the argument that the ban on same sex marriage is sex discrimination: this avenue for judicial
protection of the right to gay marriage provides something of a limiting principle. Some
opponents of same-sex marriage have argued that recognition of a same-sex marriage right is
but the first step down the slippery slope leading to a parade of horribles including judicial
protection for polygamy, pedophilia, and bestiality. Unlike sex, however, class size
(polygamy), minority (pedophilia), and animal origin (bestiality) are not suspect or quasi-
suspect classifications. Thus, equal protection for gay marriage is distinguishable and need not
lead us down that slippery slope.
95. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993) ("It is the state's regulation of
access to the status of married persons, on the basis of the applicants' sex, that gives rise to the
question whether the applicant couples have been denied the equal protection of the laws in
violation of... the Hawaii Constitution."); id. at 64 (Hawaii's marriage statute "on its face and
as applied, regulates access to the marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits on the
basis of the applicants' sex ... [and a]s such, [the statute] establishes a sex-based
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Goodridge, for example, reasons
[t]hat the classification is sex based is self-evident. The marriage
statutes prohibit some applicants, such as the plaintiffs, from
obtaining a marriage license, and that prohibition is based solely on
the applicants'gender.... Stated in particular terms, Hillary
Goodridge cannot marry Julie Goodridge because she (Hillary) is a
woman. Likewise, Gary Chalmers cannot marry Richard Linnell
because he (Gary) is a man.
96
Two principal counter-arguments have been advanced that the ban
on same-sex marriage, although it classifies according to sex, is not
invidious sex discrimination. 97 The first argument asserts that the ban on
same-sex marriage is not sex discrimination because it applies equally to
both men and women. No one, regardless of his or her sex, may marry
another person of the same sex. In this way, one might argue, the ban
does not discriminate at all on the basis of sex.
98
This counter-argument has several problems: the Equal Protection
Clause provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its
classification."); Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 971 (Mass. 2003)
(Greaney, J., concurring) ("Because our marriage statutes intend, and state, the ordinary
understanding that marriage under our law consists only of a union between a man and a
woman, they create a statutory classification based on the sex of the two people who wish to
marry."); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 905-06 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (finding that Vermont's marriage statutes provide that marriage consists
only of a union between a man and a woman, and concluding that "[t]hus, the statutes impose
a sex-based classification"). See also Li v. State, No. 0403-03057, 2004 WL 1258167, at *6
(Or. Cir. Ct. Apr. 20, 2004) (concluding that Oregon statute limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples "impermissibly classiflies] on the basis of gender").
96. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971.
97. See Clark, supra note 91, at 111 (commenting that the "strongest" of the challenges to
the sex discrimination argument are the "equal application" argument and the lack-of-animus
argument).
98. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hawaii's marriage
statute "does not establish a 'suspect' classification based on gender because all males and
females are treated alike. A male cannot obtain a license to marry another male, and a female
cannot obtain a license to marry another female."); Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003
WL 2391114, at *22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003) (noting that New Jersey "makes
the same benefit, mixed-gender marriage, available to all individuals on the same basis" and
reasoning that "[i]t is the availability of the right [to mixed-gender marriage] on equal terms,
not the equal use of the right [by gay people as contrasted with non-gay people] that is central
to the constitutional analysis"); Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13 ("The difficulty here is that the
marriage laws are facially neutral; they do not single out men or women as a class for disparate
treatment, but rather prohibit men and women equally from marrying a person of the same
sex."); see also State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (holding that a state
law prohibiting sexual intercourse with a person of the same sex applies "equally to men and
women because it prohibits both classes from engaging in sexual activity with members of
their own sex. Thus, there is no denial of equal protection on [the] basis" of sex).
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jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."9 9 It does not speak of laws
that disadvantage a group relative to another group. 10 0 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly set forth and relied upon the basic principle that
"the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect
persons, not groups."'' When a person is disadvantaged because of her
sex, therefore, it is not constitutionally adequate to argue that the
discrimination all comes out in the wash as members of other groups get
theirs.
Assume that the government prohibits the employment of law clerks
who are of the same sex as their judge: no female may clerk for a female
judge, and no male may clerk for a male judge. And let us anticipate the
specious argument that this ban on same-sex clerking can be
distinguished from the ban on same-sex marriage in that it will
disadvantage men as a group because most of the judiciary is male: let us
assume a constitutional challenge by a female applicant who wishes to
clerk for Supreme Court Justice Ginsberg, who wishes to hire her. 102 A
strong argument can be made that this statutory ban on same-sex clerking
is sex discrimination even though the prohibition on same-sex clerking
applies to all regardless of sex. A person is denied the opportunity to
clerk for the Justice of her choice for no other reason than her sex.
Neither the fact that the law does not prohibit her from clerking for
Justice Scalia (who may or may not want to hire her and for whom she
may or may not want to clerk), nor the fact that the law prohibits her
male colleague from clerking for Justice Scalia, transforms this sex
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
100. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 20 (Cal. 1948) (striking down, as violating the
federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, California's ban on interracial marriage and
reasoning that the right at issue was the right of an individual to marry rather than the right of a
racial group to be treated equally, given that "[tihe equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution does not refer to rights of the Negro race, the Caucasian race, or any other race,
but to the rights of individuals").
101. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). See also Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that "the Constitution's focus [is]
upon the individual," not groups, arguing that "under our Constitution there can be no such
thing as either a creditor or a debtor race," and citing with emphasis the Fourteenth
Amendment's dictate that no State shall "deny to any person the equal protection of the
laws").
102. In any event, the ban on same-sex marriage arguably disadvantages men as a group
relative to women in that there are in absolute numbers significantly more gay men than
lesbian women. See EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 283-320 (1994) (analyzing a survey
of a representative sample of American adults between the ages of eighteen and sixty,
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, and finding




discrimination into a neutral law in compliance with the Constitution's
mandate that the state shall deny no person the equal protection of the
laws. Similarly, the argument goes, neither the fact that the same-sex
marriage ban does not prevent a woman who wants to marry another
woman from marrying a man, nor the fact that the law prevents a man
from marrying a man undoes the sex discrimination inherent in this
prohibition based on sex. 103  Indeed, the constitutional injury is
magnified in the case of the same-sex marriage ban as the decision for
whom to clerk pales in significance in comparison to the decision as to
whom to marry.
Moreover, any sex-based discrimination can be neutralized if
abstracted to a sufficient level of generality and applied to both sexes.
For example, a statute that prohibits females from becoming pilots and
males from working as flight attendants can be generalized as a
requirement that airline employees work in positions traditionally
occupied by persons of their gender. 104 That this statute applies to all
persons irrespective of sex does not mean that the statute can be applied
irrespective of sex. And surely it is little comfort to the female who
wants to fly a plane that her brother cannot serve as a stewardess.
The equal-application counter-argument also flies in the face of the
Supreme Court's holdings and reasoning in the landmark case of Loving
v. Virginia,10 5 in which the Supreme Court held that a ban on inter-racial
marriage discriminated on the basis of race. 10 6 The Court rejected
Virginia's argument that
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by the
statements of the Framers, is only that state penal laws containing an
interracial element as part of the definition of the offense must apply
equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each race
are punished to the same degree.
107
Rather, the Court concluded that because the ban on interracial
marriage "proscribe[d] generally accepted conduct if engaged in by
members of different races," the ban classified according to race. 108 The
103. Baker, 744 A.2d at 906 (Johnson, J., concurring) (making this argument).
104. See Clark, supra note 91, at 143-44 (calling such an argument "little more than a
semantic shell game designed to make the but-for reliance on sex less conspicuous").
105. 388 U.S. 1(1967).
106. See id. at 7-8; see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (rejecting the
equal application argument and reasoning that "[s]ubstitution of 'sex' for 'race' and [the
relevant provision of the Hawaii constitution] for the fourteenth amendment yields the precise
case before us together with the conclusion that we have reached").
107. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-8.
108. Id. at 11 ("There can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest
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Court could not have been more clear in holding that "we reject the
notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial
classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the
Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial
discriminations... ."109 The ban on same-sex marriage "proscribe[s]
generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of' the same sex.
The reasoning of Loving suggests that the ban classifies according to sex
despite its "equal application."
The second principal counter-argument that the ban on same-sex
marriage is not impermissible sex discrimination asserts that the ban does
not impermissibly discriminate based on sex because it is not animated
by a hostility toward either sex. 10 The argument seeks to distinguish the
ban on same-sex marriage from Virginia's proscription of inter-racial
marriage, which the Supreme Court noted in Loving was motivated by a
desire to maintain white racial supremacy, clearly a form of race-based
animus. The argument may or may not concede that a hostility toward
gay people animates the ban. The concession is premised on the view
that sexual orientation is divisible from a person's sex. Either version is
subject to compelling attack.
First, it is essential to avoid conflating the predicate issue of
whether there is a classification based on sex with the very separate issue
of whether there is a sufficient justification for the classification.111 For
illustrative purposes, recall the example of the ban on same-sex clerking,
discussed above. Assume further that the government enacted this ban to
address what it believed to be a grave danger posed by the possibility of
solely upon distinctions drawn according to race."); see ESKRIDGE, supra note 72, at 154-65
(applying Loving to support an equal protection-based argument for legal recognition of same-
sex marriage).
109. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8; see also id. at 9 ("In the case at bar... we deal with statutes
containing racial classifications, and the fact of equal application does not immunize the
statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has
traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.").
110. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880-81 n.13 (Vt. 1999) (arguing that "[t]he test to
evaluate whether a facially gender-neutral statute discriminates on the basis of sex is whether
the law 'can be traced to a discriminatory purpose'; finding no evidence in the record of such
a discriminatory purpose, and concluding "[a]ccordingly, we are not persuaded that sex
discrimination offers a useful analytic framework for determining plaintiffs' rights under the
Common Benefits Clause" of the Vermont constitution); Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349,
357-58 (Tex. App. 2001) (distinguishing the discrimination at issue in Loving from
discrimination against same-sex couples and noting that the latter is not motivated by a desire
to preserve or promote any hostility or bias based on gender), rev'd, Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
111. See Clark, supra note 91, at 150-151 (noting that the Supreme Court in Loving v.
Virginia subjected the race-based prohibition on inter-racial marriage to heightened scrutiny in
order to determine whether the classification was invidious, not because it was invidious).
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predatory gay judges sexually harassing their law clerks of the same sex.
Assume also for the moment and for the sake of argument that a person's
sexual orientation is separable from a person's sex. Thus, it can be said
that the government acted to protect law clerks from what it perceived to
be a particularly pernicious type of sexual harassment and without
hostility toward or an intent to discriminate against anyone because of
their sex. Still, the ban on same-sex clerking on its face classifies on the
basis of sex.
A court reviewing any state sex-based classification should subject
the classification to heightened scrutiny. 112  The classification is
permissible only if the state can demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive
justification."' 113 "The State must show at least that the challenged
classification serves important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."
1 14
This "skeptical scrutiny" of all sex-based classifications is a
response to our nation's "long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination." 115 The purpose of heightened scrutiny "is to 'smoke
out' illegitimate uses of [sex-based classifications] by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool."' 116 "Absent searching judicial inquiry into the
justification for such [sex]-based measures, there is simply no way of
determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions . *..."117
Thus, intentional, differential treatment based on gender represents
an essential element of gender-based equal protection claims.
Affirmative legislative hostility, or animus, toward a particular gender is
not essential. 1 18 A facially neutral law with a disparate impact based on
gender might not trigger heightened scrutiny; 119 but this result obtains
112. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996).
113. Id. at 531.
114. Id. at 533 (internal quotations omitted).
115. See id. at 531 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
116. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (discussing strict
scrutiny of classifications on the basis of race).
117. Id. at 493 (discussing strict scrutiny of classifications on the basis of race); see also
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
118. Cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that facially neutral law does not trigger heightened scrutiny absent
showing of intentional discrimination based on race); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (same).
119. See Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding
Massachusetts veterans preference on theory that preference did not constitute a facial gender-
based classification and disparate impact based on gender was not sufficiently pervasive to
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because the plaintiff has failed to show intentional discrimination on the
basis of gender. In the case of state or federal laws limiting the right to
marry on the basis of sex, a facial gender-based classification exists and
the plaintiffs case meets the required showing of intentional
discrimination. 120
Of course, the government's justification for its sex-based
classification would be relevant to whether the classification can survive
the heightened scrutiny required by the Equal Protection Clause (or, in
the case of the federal government, by the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause). The justification, however, no matter how "exceedingly
persuasive," no matter how divorced from sex-based animus, does not
determine the level of scrutiny to which the classification is subjected. 121
The state's proffered benign purpose, therefore, cannot be a reason for
determining that the state has not classified according to sex or for
subjecting the ban on same-sex marriage to anything less than heightened
scrutiny. 12
2
Second, the argument that a ban on gay marriage is not animated by
a sex bias itself overlooks the role that gender stereotyping plays in
support of the ban and the role that discrimination against gays and
lesbians plays in reinforcing sex inequality. 123 The ban on same-sex
support inference of intentional discrimination).
120. Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (applying strict scrutiny to
school board official policy prohibiting African American students from attending "white
only" schools in Topeka, Kansas), and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303
(1879) (applying strict scrutiny to state law that expressly prohibited African American men
from serving on juries in state courts) with Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)
(invalidating Alabama constitutional provision denying voting rights to convicted felons, even
though facially neutral, because legislative history of provision established discriminatory
purpose in establishing rule) and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that a
pattern of discriminatory enforcement could establish necessary showing of intentional
discrimination where minorities prohibited from operating wooden laundries but non-
minorities permitted to operate such facilities). For a thoughtful and comprehensive
examination of the problem of showing discriminatory intent, see Michelle Adams, Causation
and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action, 79 TEX. L. REV. 643 (2001).
121. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995) ("[Strict scrutiny
review] evaluates carefully all governmental race-based decisions in order to decide which are
constitutionally objectionable and which are not.").
122. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 ("[T]he standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification."). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that effort to benefit
women by permitting them to purchase 3.2% beer at an earlier age than men constitutes
intentional discrimination against men and violates Equal Protection Clause, even though law
did not reflect any sort of invidious animus toward men either individually or as a class). But
see id. at 217-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that laws that benefit women and burden
men should not receive any heightened judicial scrutiny).
123. See generally Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys:
Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex, " "Gender, " and "Sexual Orientation " in Euro-
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marriage evidences a belief that there are certain roles that a woman
should not play (among them spouse of a woman) and that men should
not play (among them spouse of a man). 124 As Professor Andrew
Koppelman has argued:
The central outrage of male sodomy is that a man is reduced to the
status of a woman, which is understood to be degrading. Just as
miscegenation was threatening because it called into question the
distinctive and superior status of being white, homosexuality is
threatening because it calls into question the distinctive and superior
status of being male.... Lesbianism, on the other hand, is a form of
insubordination: it denies that female sexuality exists, or should exist,
American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 26 (1995) ("[G]ender discrimination cannot be
fully combated so long as sexual orientation provides a loophole for gender atypicality
discrimination."); Koppelman, supra note 90, at 199 ("[D]iscrimination against lesbians and
gay men reinforces the hierarchy of males over females and thus is wrong because it oppresses
women."); Law, supra note 90, at 187-88 ("[C]ontemporary legal and cultural contempt for
lesbian women and gay men serves primarily to preserve and reinforce the social meaning
attached to gender.... [L]egal censure of homosexuality violates constitutional norms of
gender equality."). See also Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?
Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 511, 617-49 (1992) ("[A] primary reason for [anti-gay] discrimination.., is
concern about violation of gender-role norms .... [Tihe psychological literature and the
experiences of individual lesbians and gay men also support the thesis."); id. at 617-49
(discussing concerns and advantages of gender-based arguments for legal protection of gay
men and lesbians); Koppelman, supra note 93, at 159-60 ("Just as miscegenation was
threatening because it called into question the distinctive and superior status of being white,
homosexuality is threatening because it calls into question the distinctive and superior status of
being male.").
Feminists have been particularly vocal in their insistence that discrimination against
homosexuals is related to gender stereotyping. See, e.g., Law, supra note 90, at 187-88
(arguing that "contemporary legal and cultural contempt for lesbian women and gay men
serves primarily to preserve and reinforce the social meaning attached to gender" and stating
that "the persistence of negative social and legal attitudes toward homosexuality can best be
understood as preserving traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity as well as
upholding the political, market and family structures premised upon gender differentiation").
Law argues that "homosexuality is censured because it violates the prescriptions of gender role
expectations." Id. at 196. "Lesbians and gay men pose a formidable threat to the classic
gender script. They deny the inevitability of heterosexuality." Id. at 210.
124. See Koppelman, supra note 90, at 219 ("Laws that discriminate against gays rest
upon a normative stereotype: the bald conviction that certain behavior-for example, sex with
women-is appropriate for members of one sex, but not for members of the other sex. Such
laws therefore flatly violate the constitutional prohibition on sex discrimination as it has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court."); Amar, supra note 90, at 205 n.7 ("[T]he social meaning
of sexual orientation discrimination is the legal enactment of chauvinism: real men sleep with
real women. Heterosexism is a form of sexism that perpetuates traditional gender roles and
chauvinism just as miscegenation laws were a form of racism that perpetuated traditional race
roles and white supremacy.").
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only for the sake of male gratification. 125
Some would argue that any such bias is focused on homosexuality
or sexual orientation and not gender. The implicit assumption of such an
argument is that such bias on the basis of homosexuality or sexual
orientation is less constitutionally suspect. We need not address that
argument directly here. 
126
125. Koppelman, supra note 90, at 235-36. Many feminist commentators have discussed
the way in which heterosexual intercourse reinforces male dominance and female
subordination. Prohibiting homosexual relationships perpetuates this pattern of male
dominance. See, e.g., Sandi Farrell, Reconsidering the Gender-Equality Perspective for
Understanding LGBT Rights, 13 LAW & SEXUALITY 605 (2004) ("In a society in which
marriage is the only officially sanctioned forum for sexuality and in which heterosexual
marriage and the family are essential to maintaining the sex-gender system, the proliferation of
other expressions of sexuality poses a genuine threat to those institutions and, perhaps, to the
sex-gender system itself."); Mary Becker, Strength in Diversity: Feminist Theoretical
Approaches to Child Custody and Same-Sex Relationships, 23 STETsON L. REv. 701, 730
(1994) ("One could, within a dominance framework, go on to note that biases against same-sex
relationships are part of a system of compulsory heterosexuality, a system which requires that
if women want sexual intimacy, and the emotional and economic sharing and support that
often accompany such intimacy, they must seek such intimacy only with men on the terms
worked out by and for men. Bans on same-sex relationships are designed to ensure male access
to women for sex and reproduction. Were women free to seek partnerships with women in a
society which gave equal respect and equally favorable treatment to lesbian relationships,
women would have the option to avoid the subordinating heterosexuality that pervades our
culture and to find more equal relationships with women.").
126. One of us has argued elsewhere that sexual orientation classifications merit
heightened equal protection scrutiny because gays and lesbians have suffered a long history of
discrimination despite the fact that their sexual orientation bears no relationship to their ability
to contribute to society. See E. Gary Spitko, A Biologic Argument for Gay Essentialism-
Determinism: Implications for Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process, 18 U. HAW. L.
REv. 571, 598-620 (1996). Cf Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 447 (Or. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that sexual orientation is a suspect class under Oregon case law because
sexual orientation "is widely regarded as defining a distinct, socially recognized group of
citizens, and certainly it is beyond dispute that homosexuals in our society have been and
continue to be the subject of adverse social and political stereotyping and prejudice"); Castle v.
Washington, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215, at *11 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2004)
("[Hlomosexuals... constitute[] a suspect class under the [Washington] state constitution").
The Supreme Court has never addressed this issue. Rather, in recent cases involving state
discrimination specifically targeting gay people and same-sex relationships, the Supreme
Court has applied a rational basis review with bite in striking down such discrimination. See
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (finding no rational basis for and striking down on equal
protection grounds a provision of the Colorado Constitution that prohibited legislative,
executive, or judicial protection of gay people as gay people); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578-79 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick and holding unconstitutional on due
process grounds a Texas statute that criminalized same-sex sodomy, and concluding that the
"statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual"). See also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,
961 (Mass. 2003) (concluding that Massachusetts had failed to set forth a rational basis for
denying civil marriage to same-sex couples while providing it to mixed-sex couples); Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d 864, 907 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring) (concluding that Vermont had
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Rather, we argue that a court would be justified in finding that any
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is itself a species of sex
discrimination. 127  This is so because a person's sexual orientation
cannot be disaggregated from a person's sex. Sexual orientation, as we
construct it today, is a product of an individual's sex and the sex of the
person to whom they are sexually or romantically attracted. As such,
sexual orientation cannot be defined or assigned without reference to sex.
(In the same way, miscegenation cannot be separated from race.) Thus,
sexual orientation discrimination is properly thought of as sex
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
128
In sum, a Federal Marriage Amendment that merely purports to
limit marriage for federal purposes to only a union between one man and
failed to offer a rational basis for denying same-sex couples the right to marry); Castle, 2004
WL 1985215, at * 16 (holding that Washington statutes limiting marriage to mixed-sex couples
"do not even bear a rational relationship" to interest of promoting family stability); Andersen
v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2004), at * 11
("[T]he exclusion of same-sex partners from civil marriage and the privileges attendant thereto
is not rationally related to any legitimate or compelling state interest .... ). Justice O'Connor
has stated: "When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we [the
Court] have applied a more searching form of rational basis review." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
580 (O'Connor, J., concurring). We think it likely that this rational basis review with bite will
evolve over time into an explicit heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications. See
id. at 586, 599, 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for "apply[ing] an unheard-
of form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case" and
for "having laid waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence"). There is
precedent for such an evolution: as we noted earlier, starting with Reed v. Reed and
progressing through Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Supreme Court began to
review sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause for "rationality." Over
time, the rationality review became more demanding, and this more demanding standard of
review morphed into "intermediate scrutiny" review. See supra note 41 and accompanying
text.
127. See Koppelman, supra note 90, at 203 (arguing that "stigmatization of gays in
contemporary American society functions as part of a larger system of social control based on
gender"); Amar, supra note 90, at 204-05 (setting forth an argument that "sexual orientation
discrimination is like-indeed is itself a form of-sex discrimination").
128. See Clark, supra note 91, at 116 (labeling such discrimination "sexual sexism" and
pointing out that such discrimination "uses an individual's sex to prescribe and restrict
individual opportunities"). In the same way, same-sex activity ("homosexuality") cannot be
disaggregated from the sex of the participants. Thus, discrimination on the basis of
homosexuality is properly thought of as sex discrimination on the basis of homosexuality. Cf
E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII and the
"Reasonable Heterosexist" Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56, 75-80 (1997)
(discussing the failure of courts to treat sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and positing that, with little legislative history
to guide them in interpreting the meaning of "sex" as used in Title VII, "[c]ourts have gazed
into this void.., and they have seen a reflection of their own heterosexism and homophobia:
because a presumptively heterosexist and homophobic Congress did not expressly address
employment discrimination against gay people qua gay people, it must not have intended to
protect gay people from such discrimination").
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one woman, and to authorize Congress to prescribe the effect of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause with respect to interstate recognition or non-
recognition of a same-sex marriage would not effectively limit the
Supreme Court's ability to interpret the Constitution as requiring the
states to grant same-sex marriage rights and recognition, and as requiring
the federal government to grant the incidents of marriage to same-sex
couples.
The Court's traditional approach to integrating new amendments
into existing constitutional text strongly suggests that the Court might
interpret such an amendment narrowly. Notwithstanding such an
amendment, the Court, in time, might plausibly hold that a state's refusal
to allow a same-sex marriage to be contracted within its borders is
invidious sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. So too, the Court might plausibly hold
that a state's refusal to recognize a same-sex marriage contracted in a
sister state (or a foreign nation) because of the sex of the union's partners
is invidious sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And finally, the Court might
plausibly hold that the federal government's refusal to grant all of the
incidents of marriage to same-sex marital partners (as recognized under
state law, even if only by the Constitution's compulsion) itself violates
the Fifth Amendment's ban on invidious sex discrimination. Thus, the
Court would order the federal government to extend the incidents it
extends to mixed-sex marital partners to same-sex marital partners
notwithstanding the constitutionally enshrined federal definition of
marriage.
B. No Justice, No Piece (of the Pie)
If opponents of same-sex equality wish to preclude "activist" judges
from ordering the states to allow and recognize same-sex marriages and
ordering the federal government to extend the incidents of marriage to
same-sex couples, they will need to take a more aggressive approach.
Representative Marilyn Musgrave (R-CO) and Senator Wayne Allard (R-
CO) have proposed and introduced in Congress a Federal Marriage
Amendment that would expressly preclude any federal or state court
from ordering same-sex marriage or same-sex civil union benefits. Their
proposed amendment reads: "Marriage in the United States shall consist
only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor
the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the
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union of a man and a woman."
129
The practical problem with the Musgrave/Allard Amendment is that
it paints the courts into a comer, but leaves open a window for escape for
"activist" judges intent on seeing a Constitution under which no person
may be denied the equal protection of the law. If the Constitution
requires equal treatment of same-sex and mixed-sex couples (as we have
argued a majority of Supreme Court justices might reasonably
conclude), 130 and if Congress and the states amend the Constitution to
forbid judicial or legislative recognition of same-sex marriage or judicial
compulsion of the incidents of marriage to same-sex couples, then we
foresee the possibility of one of two alternate results of litigation
challenging unequal treatment of same-sex couples.
One approach that the federal courts might take would be to order
the state to make a choice between (1) offering all of the incidents of
marriage to same-sex couples and (2) offering such incidents to no one,
not even mixed-sex married couples. Under such an approach, the Court
is merely compelling the state to make a choice, rather than compelling
the choice the state must make. 13 1 Thus, the Court has not violated the
Musgrave/Allard Amendment's directive that no court shall require that
marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried
couples or groups.
A second approach the Court might take would be to hold that
neither the federal government nor any state government may
constitutionally recognize marriage nor any rights arising from marriage
(for mixed-sex or same-sex couples): if the Constitution requires the state
to treat person A and person B equally, and if the Constitution forbids the
state from giving person B a piece of the pie, then the Constitution
compels that there shall be no state-given pie for A either. Thus, if the
Constitution requires that the state treat same-sex couples and mixed-sex
couples equally, and if the Constitution forbids the state from sanctioning
same-sex marriage, then the Constitution forbids the state from
sanctioning mixed-sex marriage. In this way, the Musgrave/Allard
Amendment would drive the state out of the business of sanctioning
marriage. The state would remain free to sanction civil unions or
domestic partnerships on a sex-neutral basis.
129. S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (2004).
130. See supra text and accompanying notes 90-128.
131. But cf Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex
Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1191-1207, 1207
(2004) (arguing "that the constitutional right to marry has a positive component to it that
places on the state, at the very least, the obligation to recognize some relationships as
marital").
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Indeed, the end of state-sanctioned marriage might be the result
even under the more light-handed DOMA-type amendment discussed
above. 132 We have argued above that when confronted with such a
DOMA-type amendment, in time the Court still might find that the same-
sex marriage ban is sex discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 133 Given this holding,
the court will have two choices: (1) order the state to provide civil unions
that are equivalent to marriage or (2) because it finds that a separate but
equal civil unions scheme is a badge of inferiority which itself would
violate the Equal Protection Clause, order the state to stop sanctioning
marriage altogether. 134
The establishment of civil unions and the granting of the incidents
of marriage to civil union partners is a very significant step in the
direction of equal treatment for same-sex couples. Nevertheless,
arguably a badge of inferiority arises from the message implicit in a
scheme which grants all the rights of marriage to same-sex couples but
refuses them the right to use the term "marriage," which the government
reserves for the exclusive use of the dominant political and social class-
heterosexuals. 135
132. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 86-128.
134. See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (advising the
Massachusetts Senate that a proposed bill that would grant to same-sex couples the right to
enter into a civil union with all the incidents of marriage, but would limit marriage to mixed-
sex couples would violate the equal protection and due process protections of the
Massachusetts Constitution); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (ordering the
Vermont legislature to provide the benefits of marriage the state offers to married couples to
same-sex couples and noting that "[w]hile some future case may attempt to establish-that
notwithstanding equal benefits and protections under Vermont law-the denial of a marriage
license operates per se to deny constitutionally-protected rights, that is not the claim we
address today"). See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that
segregation of school children by race violated the Equal Protection Clause "even though the
physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal").
135. Michael Mello, For Today, I'm Gay: The Unfinished Battle for Same-Sex Marriage
in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REv. 149, 156, 231, 242, 257 & n.547 (2000) (discussing Baker v.
Vermont and arguing that "denying committed same-sex couples the right to marry, while at
the same time giving them the same bundle of legal rights associated with marriage, stamps
them with an unmistakable badge of inferiority"); see also Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not
Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate but
(Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REv. 113, 134 (2000) (arguing that "the heterosexism inherent in
restricting same-sex couples to civil unions is reminiscent of the racism that relegated African-
Americans to separate railroad cars and separate schools and of the sexism that relegated
women to separate schools. Our society's experiences with 'separate but equal' have
repeatedly shown that separation can never result in equality because the separation is based
on a belief of distance necessary to be maintained between those in the privileged position and
those placed in the inferior position."); Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (finding that "[t]o separate
[black school children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
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Thus, the dual marriage/civil union system is analogous to a state
requirement for dual separate but equal accommodations, such as water-
fountains, one each reserved respectively for whites and non-whites.
Many would agree it is better to have water than to not have water. Yet,
even when the water fountains draw their water from the same source
and are identical except for their labeling, the separating itself sends a
message at odds with our constitutional notions of equality. 136 A
reasonable interpretation of the separate but equal scheme set up by the
dominant class is that there is something unclean or unhealthy about the
non-dominant people from which the dominant people must be
protected.137
One might reasonably conclude that the message is the same when
the state limits marriage to only mixed-sex couples and establishes
otherwise equivalent civil unions for same-sex couples: as Justice Scalia
argued in his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, "'preserving the traditional
institution of marriage' is just a kinder way of describing the State's
moral disapproval of same-sex couples."'138 When President Bush
speaks of defending the sanctity of marriage, he gives voice to the belief
that the act of allowing same-sex couples to marry devalues marriage
precisely because it allows a morally, biologically, and socially inferior
relationship to be labeled "marriage." This is somewhat analogous to the
argument that to graduate all members of a class with honors is to
diminish (indeed, destroy) the value of graduating with honors.
In the case of marriage and civil unions that provide all the incidents
of marriage, the very fact that there is no other practical consequence
arising from the separation compounds the message of inferiority that the
dominant class sends. In such a case, the only reason for the distinct
label is to protect the sensibilities of the dominant class-which would
be offended by allowing members of the non-dominant class to utilize an
institution that the dominant class cherishes. The Equal Protection
Clause condemns this motivation. 139 Romer v. Evans teaches that a
classification for the purpose of making one group unequal to another
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone").
136. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
137. See id. (endorsing the view of a lower court that "the policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group"). See also Amar, supra note
90, at 224 (positing that "the laws at issue in both Plessy and Romer are about untouchability
and uncleanness: they are not like us."). Cf id. at 233 (asserting that "revulsion or
untouchability" is a "key sociological concern of both the Attainder and Equal Protection
Clauses").
138. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (stating that the Equal Protection
Clause does not permit "a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake").
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violates the Constitution's equal protection guarantees. 140  "' [I]f the
constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest." 1
41
In February 2004, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
advised the Massachusetts Senate of the inequality inherent in a proposed
scheme which would reserve to mixed-sex couples the right to marry
while granting to same-sex couples the right to enter into a civil union
with all of the "benefits, protections, rights and responsibilities under law
as are granted to spouses in a marriage": 1
42
The bill's absolute prohibition of the use of the word "marriage" by
"spouses" who are the same sex is more than semantic. The
dissimilitude between the terms "civil marriage" and "civil union" is
not innocuous; it is a considered choice of language that reflects a
demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to
second-class status .... For no rational reason the marriage laws of
the Commonwealth discriminate against a defined class; no amount
of tinkering with language will eradicate that stain. The bill would
have the effect of maintaining and fostering a stigma of exclusion
that the Constitution prohibits. 143
The Federal Marriage Amendment would add to the Constitution a
provision that marks and separates for the purpose of excluding. It is a
provision born of intolerance, likely to breed and to be used as
justification for more hate and even violence. 144 It is a provision
reminiscent of the Jim Crow South replacing "Whites only" and
"Colored" with "Heterosexuals only" and "Homosexual." It defiles the
notion of equal protection enshrined in the Constitution while it
stigmatizes those it would exclude.
Thus, a Court may find that if the state cannot provide marriage for
140. Id. (holding unconstitutional on equal protection grounds a state constitutional
amendment that "classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else").
141. Id. at 634 (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (alteration
in original).
142. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). See also
Charles Lane, Mass. Court Backs Gay Marriage, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2004, at A1.
143. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d at 570.
144. Cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("What can
more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust
between these races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored
citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches
occupied by white citizens?").
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same-sex couples, it may not provide it to mixed-sex couples. In short,
the attempt to limit constitutional protection for the equality and dignity
of same-sex couples is likely to prove somewhat akin to trying to
compact a puddle by stomping on it; like the puddle, judicial protection
will be simply displaced outward, rather than destroyed. As we will now
explain, considerably broader amending language would be needed to
ensure that same-sex couples may be subjected to invidious forms of
discrimination.
III. THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT PROBABLY DOES NOT
REPEAL ALL THAT IT NEEDS TO REPEAL AND WOULD LACK
SUFFICIENT POLITICAL SUPPORT IF WRITTEN COMPREHENSIVELY TO
ACCOMPLISH ITS BROADER OBJECTIVES
Opponents of same-sex equality appear to face a kind of catch-22.
Perhaps in order to save marriage for only one man and one woman,
opponents of same-sex marriage will have to destroy marriage-or at
least destroy the state-sanctioned variety. In this Part, however, we
consider a means for opponents of same-sex marriage to avoid the
pitfalls of equal protection. We suggest that to ensure it is effective, a
Federal Marriage Amendment must expressly authorize state
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender. We think it
unlikely that such an amendment would gain the support necessary for
ratification. Nevertheless, we further set out prudential objections to
such an amendment that apply also with full force to the current leading
Federal Marriage Amendment proposals.
For the reasons set forth above, an amendment that merely purports
to disallow the legislative or judicial recognition or creation of "same-sex
marriage" will probably not affect the continuing validity of substantive
due process, equal protection, or other state constitutional rights (such as
a right of privacy). The amendment would have the effect of precluding
same-sex marriage, but might well not prevent federal and state courts
from demanding equal treatment for same-sex couples on an across-the-
board or program-by-program basis. Thus, for example, if the military
provides a stipend upon the death of a service member to a surviving
spouse, it is entirely conceivable that equal protection principles might
require either that the benefit be provided to a domestic partner or that no
benefit be provided at all.
Considerably broader amending language would be needed to
ensure that government may subject sexual minorities to invidious forms
of discrimination. Merely protecting marriage does not have the effect of
turning government loose to harass, oppress, or otherwise persecute
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sexual minorities in ways that would transgress core notions of equal
protection, substantive due process, and privacy. As Professor Tribe has
noted, "each amendment will later be construed by courts in ways
calculated to reconcile it with the parts of the Constitution that it was
not clearly designed to destroy."1 45 Moreover, "one can neither favor
nor oppose an amendment without at least paying attention to how it
either accords or clashes with basic constitutional postulates-postulates
that a given amendment might, after all, be construed to displace."'
146
Amending language providing something like "Nothing in this
Constitution, nor in the constitutions of any of the Several States, shall be
read or understood to prevent government discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation" would be more likely to preclude judicial recourse to
equal protection, due process, or privacy principles to disallow invidious
forms of discrimination against same-sex couples. This language would
go a very long way toward "turning off' the application of other
constitutional provisions when government classifies on the basis of
sexual orientation.
Nevertheless, some interpretive discretion would still remain. Even
if the American people amended the Constitution to authorize expressly
overt discrimination based on sexual orientation, a sufficiently creative
judge could avoid the amendment's application by simply
recharacterizing the discrimination as gender-based, rather than based on
sexual orientation. As we explained in Part II, a strong argument exists
that discrimination against same-sex couples, at least in the context of
marriage rights, constitutes a form of gender discrimination. 
147
Although the matter is not free from doubt, a serious risk would
exist that rules governing gender-based discrimination might be deployed
in aid of gay men and lesbians. So, a person or organization committed
to making America safe for heterosexuality must soldier on, seeking after
a more perfect means of disenfranchising the human rights of sexual
minorities (a kind of "Holy Grail" of constitutionalized discrimination).
A truly dedicated opponent of "special rights" for same-sex couples
should consider advocating even broader amending language. For
example: "Nothing in this Constitution, nor in the constitutions of any of
the Several States, shall be read or understood to prevent government
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender." This
formulation of the Federal Marriage Amendment would work a profound
(and, to be very clear, wholly unwarranted) change in the domestic
145. Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained
Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REv. 433, 439 n.29 (1983).
146. Id.
147. See Part II, infra.
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human rights law of the United States.
Even the most committed federal or state judge would have
difficulty eluding an express authorization of government discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender. Of course, the amendment also
would have the broader effect of reducing judicial scrutiny of any
gender-based classification to a mere rationality level (as all social or
economic legislation may be challenged as irrational148). If the
proposition that authorizing explicit gender-based discrimination seems
unthinkable, so should an effort to authorize overt discrimination based
on sexual orientation. As a philosophical matter, discrimination based on
sexual orientation is effectively a subset of gender discrimination.
It may well be true that contemporary social norms run against
drawing a material equivalency between same-sex and opposite-sex
couples. But this is an argument that proves too much. As recently as
the 1960s, the Warren Court sustained state laws that, as applied,
effectively barred women from jury service as a "convenience" to
homemakers. 149 The degree of gender equality that exists today was
utterly and completely unthinkable in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries--certainly for most men, and almost equally certainly for most
women, too.
150
148. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-47 (1998); Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-33 (1981); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483,
487-89 (1955); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949);
Royster v. Guano Co. of Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920).
149. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60-65 (1961).
150. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (noting that "the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs
to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution
of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood.... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic]
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator."). Indeed,
under the doctrine of coverture, women lost all legal personality upon marrying. As Justice
Bradley explained the matter:
So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders of the common law that it became
a maxim of that system of jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence
separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the
social state; and, notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status,
many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon this cardinal
principle still exist in full force in most States. One of these is, that a married
woman is incapable, without her husband's consent, of making contracts which
shall be binding on her or him. This very incapacity was one circumstance which
the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important in rendering a married woman
incompetent fully to perform the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an
attorney and counsellor.
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We would hope that the comprehensive-repealing version of the
Federal Marriage Amendment would represent a complete non-starter,
both in Congress and in the state legislatures. Gender-based
classifications are unjust because they relegate individuals to
opportunities based on preconceived notions of appropriate gendered
behavior: men should not raise children; women should not pursue
careers. It is fundamentally unjust to deny individuals an equal right to
pursue their own educational, social, political, and professional lives
because government believes that it knows best. But, if the proposition
that authorizing explicit gender-based discrimination seems unthinkable,
so should an effort to authorize overt discrimination against same-sex
couples. Such discrimination is effectively a subset of gender
discrimination.
There are reasons to believe such a proposed amendment is not
politically possible. Polling data from February 2004 shows that
although Americans favor preserving rights-here traditional marriage-
they do not favor discrimination or taking away rights. For example,
when a pollster asked the question, "Would you favor or oppose an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would allow marriage only
between a man and a woman?" (the preserving-a-traditional-right
option), fifty-nine percent were in favor, and thirty-three percent were
opposed. When, however, the pollster restated the question as "Would
you favor or oppose an amendment to the U.S. Constitution saying that
no state can allow two men to marry each other or two women to marry
each other?" (the discrimination option), forty-nine percent opposed the
amendment and only forty-two percent favored it.1 51  Therefore,
Congress should have to make clear that what it is doing is repealing the
Fourteenth Amendment to take away equal protection rights from gay
people and same-sex couples. If it does so, however, adoption and
ratification of the Federal Marriage Amendment seems very unlikely.
Id. See also NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK (1982); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985); HENDRIK HARTOG,
MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000); Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of
Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE
L.J. 1641, 1645-48, 1654-55 (2003).
151. See ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, PRESS RELEASE: AMERICAN PUBLIC
OPPOSES BOTH SAME-SEX MARRIAGES AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO PROHIBIT
THEM, NATIONAL ANNENBERG ELECTION SURVEY SHOWS (Feb. 9, 2004), at
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/naes/2004-03_gay-marriage-after-court-02-09-
pr.pdf (giving survey results by gender, geographic area, age, political affiliation, and
education level). See also Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Plans to Back Marriage
Amendment, WASH. POST, Feb. 11,2004, at Al.
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Thus, the "super" Federal Marriage Amendment sketched above
would almost certainly never obtain the assent of two-third majorities in
both chambers of Congress, much less ratification in three-fourths of the
states. But the core objection to a fail-safe Federal Marriage Amendment
relates not to constitutional politics, but rather to the survival of
American constitutionalism itself.
Other, prudential objections exist to the proposed Federal Marriage
Amendment. Professor Tribe has argued that "[t]he resort to
amendment-to constitutional politics as opposed to constitutional law-
should be taken as a sign that the legal system has come to a point of
discontinuity, a point at which something less radical than revolution but
distinctly more radical than ordinary legal evolution is called for." 152
Tribe strongly suggests that some amendments, because of their
subject matter, do not rise to the dignity of a constitutional interest. "Far
from being a mere assortment of unconnected rules and standards, the
Constitution can surely be understood as unified, although not rendered
wholly coherent, by certain underlying political ideals," including
"representative republicanism, federalism, separation of powers, equality
before the law, individual autonomy, and procedural fairness. 1 53 These
norms animate our very notions of constitutionalism and, although "[w]e
may choose to reject some or all of these ideals, to override them, or to
recast them," Tribe urges that "we cannot simply ignore [the
Constitution's] fundamental norms."'
154
In light of these considerations, "[h]ighly specific and controversial
substantive restrictions ... seem out of place in the [Constitution]
regardless of the desirability of the substantive policies they codify.
' 155
Enshrining very specific social policies, such as Prohibition, "renders
them dangerously resistant to modification."'156 Moreover, amendments
of this sort "trivialize the Constitution and diminish its educative and
expressive force as part of our political and legal culture." 157 If a matter
is not generally considered to be "fundamental" to our system of self-
government, Tribe suggests it has no place in the Constitution itself.
Given the 200-year period during which many states have
maintained a variety of laws regarding marriage, it is difficult to see why,
at this juncture, a federal amendment, much less one that repeals equal
protection and due process protections for all citizens based on gender, is
152. Tribe, supra note 145, at 436.
153. Id. at 439.
154. Id.
155. Id. at441.
156. Id. at 441-42.
157. Id. at 442.
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needed to suspend state control over this issue. The subject matter itself
has little to do with the processes of government, but rather addresses a
very specific legal question. "The value of the Constitution as an
evolving repository of the nation's core political ideals... depends
significantly on the limitation of its substantive content to what all (or
nearly all) perceive to be fundamentals; a document cluttered with
regulatory specifics could command no such respect. ' 158
Professor Jeff Rosen, while a law student at Yale, took Tribe's
arguments even further and suggested that constitutional amendments
transgressing "inalienable" rights were themselves unconstitutional. He
posited a flag burning amendment as a possibly "unconstitutional"
constitutional amendment. 159  Rosen identifies, among possible
candidates for inclusion in the set of "inalienable" human rights
"pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety"' 160 and "life, liberty,
property, and happiness."161
Obviously, seeking and obtaining the incidents of marriage-
including rights to visit a significant other in a hospital, to help make
medical decisions if a loved one becomes incapacitated, to have the state
recognize the existence of parental rights-all directly relate to the
"happiness and safety"' 162 of same-sex couples. Accordingly, under
Rosen's theory, the Federal Marriage Amendment might itself be
objectionable as undermining inalienable "natural rights" protected under
the Ninth Amendment. 163
As Rosen puts the matter, "[a]n amendment purporting to grant a
power that violates a retained natural right presents a special case" and
"[by striking down an enumerated power on the basis of a Ninth
Amendment natural right, the Supreme Court would not necessarily
entrench its own decisions and thwart the will of the sovereign
people."' 164 Rosen suggests that an initial invalidation of an amendment
158. Id.
159. See Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100
YALEL.J. 1073, 1073-74, 1084-86, 1088-92 (1991).
160. Id. at 1078-79.
161. Id. at 1082-83.
162. Id. at 1079
163. See id. at 1086-89.
164. Id. at 1088. Rosen's argument arguably represents the flip side of the coin
represented by the extra-textual amendment theories advocated by scholars like Akhil Amar
and Bruce Ackerman. Both have argued that "we the people" retain an independent ability to
amend the Constitution, independent of the formal Article V processes. See BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 54 (1991) (arguing that popular sovereignty
implies the ability of extra-textual amendment of the federal Constitution); Akhil Reed Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043,
1056 (1988) (arguing same); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
[Vol. 76
DANGEROUS CONSTITUTIONAL STRAITS
transgressing inalienable natural rights "would 'remand' the amendment
back to the people or their Article V delegates and ask them if they really
believe the right to be natural and retained."
' 165
On remand, the citizenry could override the Supreme Court's
objection by using express language indicating an intention to abrogate
the natural right at issue. "In this way, judicial review of the substance
of an amendment does not thwart popular sovereignty, but merely
ensures that it is deliberately exercised as the Founders intended-within
the boundaries of natural law, as defined by the people themselves."
' 166
Rosen argues that this theory does not impose new limits on the scope of
Article V, but rather "merely makes explicit the limitations already
implicit in the history and theory of Article V."
16 7
To be clear, we do not endorse the broader implications of Rosen's
argument. 168  In our view, Article V establishes no substantive
limitations on the scope of the amending power. As Professor Walter
Dellinger has observed, "[j]udicial review of the merits of proposed
amendments is illegitimate for the simple reason that the Constitution
places virtually no limits on the content of amendments." ' 169 "Congress
is constitutionally free to propose, and the states to ratify, any
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 458-59, 462-87 (1994) (arguing, for
example, that a majority of the citizenry should be able to force constitutional change, outside
the formal structures of Article V); see also Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra, at 458-59
(arguing that concurrence of a simple majority of the electorate should be a sufficient predicate
for constitutional change); but see Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original
Understanding and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 121, 126-73 (1996)
(arguing that Amar's theory of extraconstitutional amendment is unwarranted by the text,
history, or original understanding of Article V and would undermine the project of American
constitutionalism). Just as "we the people" can amend the Constitution without formal
recourse to Article V, the Supreme Court can protect "we the people" from amendments
supported by the federal and state governments that restrict or abrogate "inalienable rights."
165. Id. at 1088-89.
166. Id. at 1089.
167. Id.
168. Indeed, one wonders whether Professor Rosen still endorses his theory. Cf Jeffrey
Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, §6 (Magazine), at 48
(strongly suggesting that the Supreme Court's Lawrence decision would ignite a political
backlash that would impede the progress of sexual minorities in obtaining full and equal
treatment). If Rosen questions the viability of a decision like Lawrence, it seems doubtful that
he would now support a Supreme Court decision that purported to invalidate an amendment
passed by two-thirds majorities in Congress and ratified by thirty-eight states because it
transgresses an unenumerated "natural right." See id. at 50 (criticizing Lawrence because "its
roots in the Constitution are not self-evident" and "[t]aken to its logical conclusion, Kennedy's
argument would seem to invalidate all moral restrictions on intimate associations that, it could
be said, cause no harm to others").
169. Walter Dellinger, Constitutional Politics: A Rejoinder, 97 HARV. L. REV. 446, 447
(1983).
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amendment whatsoever." 170 Moreover, it bears noting that the Supreme
Court itself has proven remarkably resistant to the argument that it
should attempt to police the amendment process itself,171 much less
superintend the substantive content or legitimacy of proposed and
enacted amendments. 172 All that said, however, we agree with Professor
Rosen on at least one main point: an amendment should directly
reference other, pre-existing amendments, if the amendment's framers
intend for it to override or abolish the rights existing under those
amendments.
In the case of flag burning, Rosen suggests language stating that
"[f]reedom of speech shall not be construed as a natural right retained by
the people and protected by the First and Ninth Amendments." 173 We
believe that, in the context of same-sex marriage or the extension of
incidents of marriage to same-sex couples, similarly specific language
would be necessary to ensure that the amendment actually achieved its
core purposes. Indeed, to be fail safe, the amendment should repeal due
process and equal protection scrutiny of any gender-based classification.
Only by repudiating the ideal of rational government treatment without
regard to gender could the proponents of the Federal Marriage
Amendment rest easy that the amendment would absolutely shut the door
on any and all formal legal recognition of same-sex couples. Of course,
the implications of such an amendment are shocking and, we believe,
make congressional adoption of such an amendment virtually
unthinkable.
The relative paucity of successful attempts at constitutional
amendment provide yet another consideration mitigating against the
submission of an effective Federal Marriage Amendment to the state
legislatures. For a period of over 200 years, Congress has submitted only
a handful of proposed constitutional amendments to the states for their
consideration. 174 Notwithstanding the deeply felt and sincere concerns
170. Id. at 448.
171. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
172. See, e.g., Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922) (rejecting challenge to validity
of Nineteenth Amendment); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (rejecting
challenges to validity of Eighteenth Amendment). Scholarly commentators suggested that
both the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments might be invalid because of their subject
matters. See Everett V. Abbot, Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment, 20 COLUM.
L. REV. 183 (1920); William L. Marbury, The Nineteenth Amendment and After, 7 VA. L. REV.
1, 14 (1920). Even Rosen acknowledges this adverse history, although he does not find it to be
dispositive. See Rosen, supra note 159, at 1084 & 1084 n.71, 1087-89.
173. Rosen, supra note 159, at 1092.
174. See Dellinger, supra note 169, at 427-29 (noting that, of over five thousand bills
proposing amendments to the federal Constitution, "only thirty-three received the necessary
two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress"). See also ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND
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surrounding the issue of same-sex marriage, at the end of the day, the
question for federal and state legislators should (indeed must) be: is this
subject sufficiently pressing to justify establishing a permanent rule
barring any legal change regarding the legal regime governing same-sex
couples? To borrow a turn of phrase from Professor Tribe, we believe
that we have not reached "a point of discontinuity, a point at which
something less radical than revolution but distinctly more radical than
ordinary legal evolution is called for." 175 We share and endorse Tribe's
view that a Constitution "cluttered with regulatory specifics" will not
endure. 1
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Although the matter is not free from doubt, we hope that the
American people and their elected representatives will choose to defend
the sanctity of the Constitution and to avoid the creation of a dangerous
precedent of amending the Constitution in response to a particular, state
law issue. 177 The amending process will have the effect of ending rather
than facilitating debate over the proper legal response to the social fact of
non-traditional families. As former Senator Alan Simpson has argued,
"[t]o reach the best understanding, the debate over gay men and women
in America should not focus on what drives us apart but on how to make




The Federal Marriage Amendment represents a clear and unjustified
break with our constitutional traditions, transgresses core principles of
our federal system, and will do nothing to advance the vitality of families
in the United States. Moreover, as we have argued, there is good cause
to question whether the Federal Marriage Amendment will effectively
constrain the federal and state judiciaries' ability to afford various legal
protections-perhaps including marriage itself-to same sex couples. In
light of all of these considerations, Congress would be wise to leave the
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1978) (providing a historical overview of the
amendment process).
175. Tribe, supra note 145, at 436.
176. Id. at 442.
177. See Lea Brilmayer, Full Faith and Credit, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2004, at A16
(discussing the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health and the efforts to overturn it by federal constitutional
amendment, and noting that "[i]n our 200-year constitutional history, there has never yet been
a federal constitutional amendment designed specifically to reverse a state's interpretation of
its own laws").
178. Simpson, supra note 25.
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question of what constitutes a valid marriage to the states and decline to
set a dangerous and unwarranted constitutional precedent.
179
179. See Tribe, supra note 145, at 445 (suggesting that "remembering that it is an
amendment to the Constitution we are considering may be almost as important as remembering
that it is a Constitution we are, in the end, amending").
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